Stop and Frisk  (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police) by Schwartz, Herman
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 58 | Issue 4 Article 2
1968
Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of
the Police)
Herman Schwartz
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Herman Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 433
(1967)
TitE JOUR AL OF CRIMINAL L.w, CRIMINOLOGY %N D POLICE SCIENCE Vol. 5S, N ,. 4
Copyright @ 1967 by Northestern University SChool of Law Printed in U.S.A.
STOP AND FRISK
(A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police)*
HERMAN SCHWARTZ
Professor Schwartz, who received his LL.B. from Harvard Law School, served as law clerk to
Judge J. Edward Lumbard of the United States Court of Appeals from 1956 to 1957. After four
years in private practice, he served as assistant counsel to the United States Senate Sub-committee
on Antitrust and Monopoly, and in 1963 joined the faculty of the State University of New York
at Buffalo School of Law where he is Professor of Law.
Professor Schwartz's article is the first published work to closely examine the operation of New
York's stop and frisk statute and the rationale of the New York cases interpreting it. Though appre-
ciative of some of the arguments made in support of both the wisdom and constitutionality of field
interrogation, Professor Schwartz concludes, although reluctantly, that except for extraordinar-
or emergency circumstances, field interrogation, especially when accompanied by a frisk or search,
is unconstitutional, unwise, and an unnecessary irritant to already inflamed police-minority group
tensions.
For the last few years, state courts and legisla-
tures have been steadily trying to legitimate police
power and practices endangered by the Supreme
Court's decisions. One of the most significant of
these efforts is New York's 1964 "Stop and Frisk"
law, which authorizes temporary detention and
search on less than probable cause.' The power to
stop and frisk under both common law and statute
has been invoked in some twelve reported New
* The author wishes to express his deepest apprecia-
tion to the many who commented on this manuscript,
including Professors Anthony G. Amsterdam, Lawrence
Herman, and Yale Kamisar, Daniel Rezneck, Esq.,
Leslie Foschio, Esq. and members of the Buffalo Police
Department. 'Ihey, of course, are not to be held re-
sponsible for any judgments made herein.
1 N.Y. CODE CRI. PROc. § 180-a; People v. Rivera,
14 N.Y.2d 441 (1964). The power was made available
almost simultaneously by statute and by judicial de-
cision, the statute becoming effective July 1, 1964 and
Rizeera being decided on July 10, 1964. In addition to
New York, other state courts have granted the police
such powers. E.g., State v. Dilley, 1 BNA CR. L.R.
2190 (7/19/67) (N.J. 1967); Commonwealth v. Hicks,
209 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A.2d 873 (Super. Ct. Pa. 1966);
3tate v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E. 2d 114
(1966), cert. granted. 87 Sup. Ct. 2050 (1967); Common-
wealth v. Lehan, 196 N.E.2d 840 (Mass. 1964); People
v. Martin, 293 P.2d 52 (Cal. 1956). In addition, several
states have adopted the Uniform Arrest Act. Recently,
Massachusetts adopted a provision virtually equivalent
to the search provision of the New York Law, Acts of
1967, C. 368, 1 BNA CR. L.R. 2301 (8/23/67). For the
extent of such practices, see Galvin & Radelet, A -a-
lional Suney of Police and Comnmunity Relations, pre-
pared for the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice 328-31 (Mich. St.
1967). The President's Commission is hereafter cited
as "President's Commission."
York cases as of September 15, 1967,2 and in the
October 1967 term, the Supreme Court of the
United States will consider two of the cases de-
cided under the statute and two from other states.3
Few current problems are more difficult or more
important. Violent disorders have torn apart our
cities in each of the last four summers, steadily
increasing in number and destructiveness, and
there is reason to think stop and frisk practices
have contributed to this. At the same time, con-
cern over crime in the streets has substantially
heightened as the figures for reported crimes con-
tinue to rise sharply; many in law enforcement
and elsewhere believe that the power to stop and
frisk is necessary to keep the crime rate from get-
ting worse. Thus, each group sees stop and frisk as
crucial, but for sharply opposed reasons.
To summarize the positions in somewhat more
detail, the proponents claim that the power to
2 Of the twelve, two involved events prior to July 1,
1964, the date § 180-a became effective, and were
decided on the basis of common-law powers. People v.
Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441 (1964); People v. Pugach, 15
N.Y.2d 65 (1965). There have also been a few federal
cases applying the New York statute. United States v.
Lewis, 362 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v.
Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238 (1966), prob. nris.
noted, 87 Sup. Ct. 1291 (1967); People v. Sibron, 18
N.Y.2d 603 (1966), prob.juris. noted, 87 Sup. Ct. 1042
(1967); see also Wainwright v. New Orleans, 248 L.a.
1097, 184 So.2d 23 (1966), cert. granted, 87 Sup. Ct.
700 (1967); State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App.2d 122, 214
N.E.2d 114 (1966), cert. granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 2050
(1967).
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forcibly stop and to search for self-protection, a
power long and widely exercised by police, is neces-
sary to prevent crime in a period of frighteningly
rising crime rates and civil disorders; further, that
the invasion of personal liberty entailed by such
a detention and search is relatively minor, is
constitutional because reasonable, and can be
controlled by the courts and by effective police
administration. Opponents, on the other hand, dis-
pute the need, the mildness of the affront, and the
susceptibility to judicial control of such practices;
they point to the evidence that such police tactics
produce minority group resentment and hostility.
Additionally, they deplore the abandonment of
probable cause, the traditional constitutional stand-
ard necessary to deprive a person of his liberty, in
favor of reasonable suspicion, which they find too
vague.4 If the opponents are right, then to legiti-
mate this power is to sanction a serious invasion of
individual rights, to set a precedent for circumvent-
ing the probable cause requirement which may be
repeated many times, and to grant judicial approval
to conduct which contributes significantly to
civil strife. If they are wrong, and they prevail,
there may be a serious interference with crime pre-
vention resulting in higher crime rates, fear, in-
creased police and community resentment and re-
flected pressure on individual liberties in other
areas. And if each is partly right and partly wrong,
then we may be faced with another example of the
classic problem of compromising liberty and se-
curity, in an especially volatile setting.
Until now, we have had relatively few decisions
and little practical knowledge in this area. Re-
cently, some studies and a substantial number of
decisions in New York have appeared, and in an
effort to shed some light on these issues, this article
will consider these cases and studies. First, the
New York courts' experience with stop and frisk
will be considered, together with certain recent
empirical data, to show what practices are actually
taking place. It will be seen that there has been
an almost total judicial abdication (at least in New
York) of whatever modest supervision the courts
might have exercised over an intrusion that is
quite far reaching. Thereafter, an evaluation will
be made of how this power assists law enforcement
and community security. It will be concluded that
4 Compare Kuh, Reflections on New York's "Stop-
and-Frisk" Law and Its Claimed Unconstitutionality,
56 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 32, 38 (1965) with Souris,
Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search-The Use and
Misuse of Euphemisms, 57 J. CRIm. L., C. & P. S. 251
(1966).
exercise of this power may actually reduce police
effectiveness, but that in some situations, there
may be no choice but to allow such authority. The
over-all, rather hesitant, conclusion is that given
the breadth of the power, the inability of courts
and others to control it, the social consequences of
its widespread use, and the possibility that
less intrusive alternatives are available and ef-
fective, the heavy burden imposed on those who
would depart from traditional constitutional doc-
trine has not been carried, except with respect to a
few exceptional circumstances.
Ordinarily, forcible detention would be dis-
cussed first, and then the power to search. But
because the search is the more intrusive, and often
more important for law enforcement-indeed, it is
frequently the reason for the initial stop, as will
appear-judicial treatment of the searches that
have reached the New York courts will be con-
sidered first, together with some more general back-
ground information. The facts in these cases will
be explored in much detail in order to indicate
exactly when the New York police are now au-
thorized to forcibly stop and search.
STOP AND FRISK IN THE NEw YORK CASES AND IN
PRACTICE
The Power to Search
The New York "stop and frisk" statute provides
as follows:
§ 180-a. Temporary questioning of persons in
public places; search for weapons.
1. A police officer may stop any person
abroad in a public place whom he reasonably
suspects is committing, has committed or is
about to commit a felony or any of the crimes
specified in section five hundred fifty-two of
this chapter, and may demand of him his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
2. When a police officer has stopped a
person for questioning pursuant to this section
and reasonably suspects that he is in danger
of life or limb, he may search such person for
a dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds
such a weapon or any other thing the
possession of which may constitute a crime, he
may take and keep it until the completion of
the questioning, at which time he shall either
return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such
person.
Although enacted in order to fill what was widely
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thought to be a gap in police powers, a few days
after it became effective the New York Court of
Appeals held in People v. Rivera that even before
the statute, policeman had such authority.
The facts of Rivera were these: At 1:30 A.M.,
May 25, 1962, three detectives were driving in an
unmarked car on the lower East Side in New-York,
"a tenement neighborhood". 6 They "observed" two
Puerto Rican men who "walked up in front, out-
side a bar and grill, stopped, looked in the window,
continued to walk a few steps, came back and
looked in the window again".7 This conduct con-
tinued for about five minutes. The record shows
that the street was not deserted but that "a small
newsstand" was open. When the two men saw the
officers, they started to walk away. One of the
detectives got out of the car, calling "Hold it.
This is the police". The officer "patted" the out-
side of defendant Rivera's clothing, felt something
hard, went into Rivera's pocket, and found a gun.
At the hearing the detective explained that he had
frisked for "my own protection. And because of
the numerous number of stick-ups in our precinct
at this time". On cross-examination, he admitted
that although he was apprehensive it was not for
fear of being attacked-"At that time we didn't
know what we had". Rivera himself told the
detective, when asked, that he was carrying the
gun for his own protection. The detective also
said that since this was a Puerto Rican neighbor-
hood, it was "not unusual... to see a Puerto Rican
in this neighborhood at this time of night".8
On the basis of pre-statute common law, the
court upheld the search on the ground that when
the officer felt the hard object, "inferred by him
correctly to be a gun, he had probable cause to
arrest defendant and to proceed at once further to
invade his clothing and take the gun".
9
Upon these facts, a case for some danger can be
made, although it is hard to believe that these three
armed policeman were in any substantial peril, and
the police witness admitted as much. The court,
however, made no such particularistic attempt, but
held, in effect, that under the New York common
law every stop can be followed by a "frisk" saying:
14 N.Y.2d 441, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964). There had
been warning signs of the Rivera result in People v.
Entrialgo, 14 N.Y.2d 733, 250 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1964).
6 Record on Appeal to New York Court of Appeals
in People v. Rivera 27.
7 14 N.Y.2d at 444, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
8 Record, supra n. 6 at 32-33.
9 14 N.Y.2d at 447, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
If we recognize the authority of the police to
stop a person and inquire concerning unusual
street events [which authority was found nec-
essary for crime prevention in the first part of
the opinion] we are required to recognize the
hazards involved in this kind of duty. The an-
swer to the question propounded may be a bullet;
in any case the exposure to danger could be very
great. We think the frisk is a reasonable and
constitutionally permissible precaution to
minimize that danger.'0
Since "the answer ... may [always] be a bullet"
it is difficult to conceive of a case when the police
would not be justified in frisking for self-protection.
Judge Van Voorhis, who concurred in Rivera, later
described that decision as allowing a frisk "at the
officer's whim"."
The court sought to minimize the impact of its
ruling by distinguishing a "frisk" from a "search",
saying that, "as it is generally understood in police
usage", the frisk is much less intrusive than a
search, being only "a contact or patting of the
outer clothing of a person to detect by the sense of
touch, if a concealed weapon is being carried". Be-
ing less intensive than a "full-blown search" it re-
quires less to justify it. And the court added, reas-
suringly: "The sense of exterior touch here involved
is not very far different from the sense of sight or
hearing upon which police customarily act.... [It
is] a minor inconvenience and petty indignity." 12
From" the suspect's viewpoint, it would take
exceptionally dull nerve endings to agree that
touching someone "is not very far different" from
seeing or hearing someone. The court's comment
is particularly incredible if one considers what a
"frisk" really is as it is "generally understood in
police usage". In People v. Hoffman, " an officer
frisked two men before taking them down to the
police station to check out their story, saying:
I asked both the defendant and his passenger
to put their hands on the roof of the police car
and I started from their necks and worked
across their shoulders and under their arms (in-
dicating) all the way down their sides and
10 14 N.Y.2d at 446, at 462-63 (Emphasis added).
u People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d at 606; ("frisking a
suspect can be done in practice (though not in theory)
at the officer's whim.") See also id. at 605 ("The
power to frisk is practically unlimited.")
12 14 N.Y.2d at 447, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 463, 464.




down each leg to determine whether they could
possibly have a weapon on them or not.
4
This kind of "frisk" could involve less of an in-
trusion than a so-called "full-blown search", but it
is "very far different from the Sense of sight or hear-
ing", and can be extremely offensive to the victim.
In granting the police the authority to search for
self-protection whenever a stop is made, the court
was simply accommodating itself to standard police
practice. Thus, the President's Crime Commission
Task Force on the Police reported searches in "81.6
percent of stops reported" in New York.1 5 And this
is not surprising. At least one reason is that the
patrolman is advised to "assume every person he
encounters may be armed", 6 for the officer cannot
predict reliably when a suspect will attack him,
and the consequences of a mistake can be fatal.
"Thus, the exceptional case, an assault on an in-
terrogating officer dictates what self-protection
measures will be used in the routine case." 17
,1 Record on Appeal to Appellate Division in People
v. Hoffman 56. This pat was made at a time when the
officer was found by the court to have had probable
cause but it is clear that the officer saw this not as a
search but only as a frisk, since he admitted he had not
arrested them and was taking them in only for investi-
gation. Id. at 58-59, 53-55. An expressly intended search
incident to arrest was later made at the police station
and turned up forged credit cards in a pocket. Private
conversations with police also indicate that the pro-
cedure employed in Hoffnan is "customary usage."
The frisk can be particularly intrusive where there is
reason to suspect the presence of small knives, as there
often is. "Thus, a frisk designed to turn up such a small
knife would be similar to a search." TFFANY, McLN-
TYRE & ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRiME 47 (1967).
(This is an American Bar Foundation study, and is
hereafter cited as "DETEcTio-.") See generally, id. at
45-48, ch. 3. Where a large group of suspects is involved,
a wall search, with guns, may be involved. Id. at 48,
n. 8. Butsee Kuh, supra n. 4 at 37 (claiming a substantial
distinction between a search and a frisk).
15 Task Force on tie Police, THE PRESmENT'S COM-
MIsSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADINISTRATION
OF JusTIcE 185 (1967) (hereafter cited as "Police Task
Force"). A 1966 field study of high-crime areas in
Boston, Chicago and Washington, D. C., concluded that
only 20% of police-suspect encounters and 33% of the
field interrogations involved a search. Reiss and Black,
Interrogation and the Criminal Process (Mimeo 10-11)
(pub. forthcoming in Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science Nov. 1967.)
16 BRISTOW, FIELD INTERROGATION 25 (2d ed. 1964)
(hereafter cited as "BRISTOW"). See also the Chicago
Police Manual, quoted at DETEcTION 45. Conver-
sations with Buffalo police confirm the universality of
this attitude which is based on the theory "It only takes
one mistake."
17 DETECTION 45. Jerome Skolnick provides an
insightful discussion of some of the other theoretical
and practical implications of the fact that the officer
sees everyone he encounters as a potential assailant.
Rivera is troublesome more for some of its lan-
guage and implications than for its holding on the
specific facts before the court. People v. Pugach,"8
however, is quite a different matter. It has been
widely condemned, even by those who approve
Rivera," for on the facts and language of the Pugach
opinion, police may be able to make a search
virtually as broad as that incident to a valid arrest
even where a "frisk" is unnecessary to eliminate
whatever danger may exist, where there is actually
very little danger, and perhaps even where they
have not exercised their power to forcibly stop.
Burton N. Pugach, a lawyer and a disappointed
suitor, was convicted in 1962 of having thrown acid
in his ex-girl friend's face on June 15, 1959.20 He
had previously been convicted in 1960 of illegally
possessing a concealed gun. According to the court's
opinion in the concealed gun case, which raised
the stop and frisk issue, police
had been investigating defendant in connec-
tion with "another matter" which had oc-
curred June 15, 1959. By prearrangement, on
the morning of October 30, 1959, three city
police officers went by squad car to an office
building in which the defendant was known to
have an office, and parked at the curb. At
about 10:30 A.M. they observed the defendant
Pugach, carrying a brief case, enter the office
building. Two of the officers followed him into
the building, accosted him by the elevator and
spoke to him about the "other matter", follow-
ing which he was asked to accompany them
and, with an officer on either side, he was
escorted to the parked squad car. There they
were joined by a third officer. One officer
entered the rear seat of the squad car followed
by the defendant and another officer. The
third officer entered the front seat at the
right of the driver. While all were so seated,
the officers seated on either side of defendant
in the rear seat proceeded, in police parlance,
to "frisk" the defendant. The latter was then
wearing a blue coat with a belt which the
officers asked him to untie. As he did so, the
SKOINICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 44-70 (1966)
(hereafter cited as "ScorNcxc").
Is 15 N.Y.2d 65, 67-68; 255 N.Y.S.2d 833, 834-38
(1965).
"9 See e.g., A.L.I., A MODEL ConF oF PRx-AXXAIGN-
MENT PROCEDuRE, Tent. Drft. No. 1, Commentary 103
(hereafter cited as ALl code); Note, 65 Coum. L. REv.
848, 859 (1965).
20 21 A.D.2d 854, affd, 16 N.Y.2d 504 (1965).
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defendant put the brief case which he had been
holding on his lap with the handle and opening
toward his body on the car floor between his
feet. The officers completed the "frisk" with-
out incident, after which defendant retied the
belt to his coat, reached down, picked up the
brief case and placed it on his lap as before
with the opening near his body. One of the
officers seated at his side then reached over,
took the brief case and, as he testified, "put
it on the floor in front of me between my legs".
He unzipped the fastening, looked in, saw a
gun and exclaimed: "Look what I found", at
the same time showing the brief case to his
fellow officers. The gun it contained was then
removed, the chamber broken and five live
shells fell out.
The court went on to say that:
... the record is silent as to why the defend-
ant had been under surveillance or what was
said in the conversation between the defendant
and the officers just before he was asked to
enter the squad car. The defendant now says
that, absent a record showing as to the "other
matter", no probable cause existed for an
arrest, absent which the search of his brief
case was illegal and the fruits thereof unavail-
able as evidence against him.
Relying on Rivera, the court found that the
search of the zippered briefcase was a "frisk",
justified "upon grounds of safety". Disclosure of
the "other matter" was unnecessary, because the
defendant had been under investigation and was
"being taken to a police station for further ques-
tioning. . . . Under all the circumstances the in-
clusion of the brief case in the 'frisk' was not so
unreasonable as to be constitutionally illegal"
2 '
Judge Fuld dissented, stressing the absence of
probable cause "on the basis of the record before
us", the lack of any real danger to the officers,
and the obvious protective alternative of "simply
placing... [the brief case] on the front seat of the
car, out of the reach of the defendant"Yn
The decision is clearly insupportable for the very
reasons given by Judge Fuld. It is hard to imagine
that the three policemen were in any real danger
from Pugach, as he sat between two officers in the
back seat, with another in front. Pugach was a
lawyer who was acquainted and familiar with
2115 N.Y.2d at 67-68, 69; 255 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
= 15 N.Y.2d. at 71; 255 N.Y.S.2d at 836-37.
police officers, and obviously aware of the futility
and danger of any attempt to overcome three
armed policemen. There may have been a remote
suspicion of danger, but hardly "reasonable"
suspicion. Moreover, how can a search of a zippered
brief case ever be justified as a "frisk" of the person
for safety?" Stop and frisk Guidelines issued by
the New York State Combined Council of Law
Enforcement Officials, which drafted and promoted
the "stop and frisk" provision, suggested that in
the application of that statute a suspect's brief case
should not be searched but put outside his reach,
2"
and this would seem applicable to all stops, whether
authorized by statute or by common law.
Finally, on the facts of the case, there is no
indication that Pugach was not going to the station
voluntarily, for the record contains no evidence
that he was in fact being "taken down" against his
will.2 If so, then the decision may validate an
extensive search of those who are invited and
voluntarily come down to the station house.
In sum, Pugach seems to authorize a "frisk" which
is as broad as a search incident to arrest, even
where there is no forcible detention at all.
Such a far-reaching decision requires more than
the brief treatment it received, unless there is some-
thing more here than meets the eve--and there
obviously is, as the mysterious references to the
"other matter" intimate. The fact is that when
Pugach was "accosted" at his elevator and spoken
to, he was being formally arrested for the maiming
of his girl friend, and apparently with probable
cause. The brief case was searched incident to that
arrest, and when the gun was found,6 it was de-
cided, apparently for strategic reasons, to try him
first for illegal possession of a weapon (under Penal
"Compare Commonwealth v. Lehan, 196 N.E.2d
840 (Mass. 1964) (police would not be allowed to search
packages carried by the suspect) and United States v.
Margeson, 259 F. Supp 256, 267 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
24 "If the suspect is carrying an object such as a
handbag, suitcase, sack,. etc. which may conceal a
weapon, the officer should not open that item, but
should see that it is placed out of reach of the suspect
so that its presence will not" represent any immediate
danger to the officer." Memorandum from the New
York State Combined Council of Law Enforcement
Officials Re: The "Stop-and-Frisk" and "Knock
Knock" Laws I.D.6 (July 1, 1964) (hereafter cited
as "Stop-and-Frisk, Guidelines"), reprinted in HALL
& KAMiSAR, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 199, 202 (1966).
25 We are told only that he was "asked to accompany
the officers." 15 N.Y.2d at 67; 233 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
26 The defendant raised the possibility that police
knew it was there. See Respondent's Brief in Oppo-
sition to Petitioner's Jurisdictional Statement and
Replying to Questions 2 and 3, pp. 5-6.
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Law § 1897). In order to avoid prejudicing the
weapon possession trial, however, the officer testi-
fying to the circumstances of the arrest and search
at that trial carefully avoided referring to the rea-
son for "accosting" Pugach. Under pre-Mapp law
in 1960, when the case was tried, the prosecution
obviously thought that it did not have to present
any separate legal basis for the search of the brief
case, and the circumstances are very ambiguous as
to whether an objection was even made. The appeal
to the Court of Appeals came up post-Mapp, how-
ever, and Pugach there argued that the search was
illegal and, contrary to the People's reply, that he
had adequately raised the point at trial. In the
People's brief, the "other matter" was fully dis-
closed as follows:
It so happened that trial counsel for the
defendant was the same attorney who repre-
sented the defense in People v. Loria, 10
N.Y.2d 368. In the Loria case, which had been
tried six months before Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, was decided, an appropriate objec-
tion on constitutional grounds had been made.
The reason this attorney did not likewise
object in the case at bar is because he was
aware that the gun had been found on Pugach
immediately after he had been taken into
custody for the crime of maiming, arising out
of the acid-blinding of one, Linda Riss, com-
mitted on June 15, 1959. Upon the completion
of their investigation the police arrested
Pugach and his confederates, at the same time
but at different places, on October 30, 1959.
Defendant has since been convicted of the
maiming and the judgment has been unan-
imously affirmed by the Appellate Division
[Defense] Counsel asked [officer] O'Connor
whether his presence in the building where
Pugach had his office was "accidental" (S. M.
p. 44). To avoid telling the jury that he and
his fellow officers were there to arrest Pugach
for the acid-blinding of Linda Riss, which
would have constituted prejudicial error,
O'Connor's answer was, "We were there to
question the defendant, Pugach, relative to
another matter" (S. M. p. 44).
Had defendant suggested at the trial that
the question was asked to establish alleged
illegality of the search and seizure of the gun
and, if the Court had permitted such an
inquiry to be made, there would have been
no restriction upon Detective O'Connor
revealing that the search had been made
after Pugach had been arrested for the other
crime. This opportunity was not given to
the People because defendant never even
thought of litigating the alleged illegality of
the search, at the trial in 1960.2
Despite the foregoing statement, both the ma-
jority and dissent in the Court of Appeals decision
thought that the Prosecution had conceded that
no probable cause had been shown in the gun
case and so stated in early versions of their re-
spective opinions. The District Attorney, how-
ever, immediately denied making such a con-
cession and reference thereto was deleted from
the final versions of the opinions.n Unsatisfied
with this, the District Attorney moved to rear-
gue, declaring:
The vital part of the opinion about which
the People complain is that which finds that
the search of defendant's briefcase could not
have been incidental to a lawful arrest because
no probable cause existed for the arrest; that
the search of the briefcase was an incident of
a frisk of defendant who had been taken into
custody for further questioning.
Respondent respectfully submits that if those
facts were true, the People would not have sought
to justify the search upon the theory of the ruling
made by this Court on that basis.
The record is not "silent as to why the
defendant had been under surveillance or
what was said in the conversation between
defendant and the officers just before he was
asked to enter the squad car". The truth,
as the record shows, is that defendant was not
under surveillance. The police were simply
waiting for him and when they saw him, they
immediately placed defendant under arrest.
n Respondent's Brief in the Court of Appeals,
People v. Pugach 7-8.
28Judge Fuld's unrevised opinion read: "It is con-
ceded that the search of the briefcase may not be
justified as incident to a lawful arrest, for there was no
probable cause for such action and the People frankly
acknowledge that the defendant had not been arrested."
This and apparently similar statements in the slip
sheet majority opinion were eliminated. See Respon-
dent's Brief in Opposition to Petitioner's Jurisdictional
Statement, Answering Questions 2 and 3 in Appellant's
Jurisdictional Statement.
438 - [Vol. 58
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On a search, incidenlal to this arrest, the gtn
was discovered.29
Nevertheless, no further revisions were made.
Several explanations are available for the court's
refusal to revise its opinion more extensively: one
is simply inertia; another is that the court delib-
erately intended to hand down a very far-reaching
opinion. A third is that there was simply not
enough evidence of probable cause on this record
to support an incidental search. The conviction
would therefore have had to be overturned if the
search were insupportable on the "frisk" grounds,
and the court was unwilling to accept such a
result where the search was clearly justified on
facts dehors the record.
Of the three explanations, the last seems the
most likely, though it is of course only a guess.
If that guess is sound, however, the case may be an-
other example of judicial reluctance to let a guilty
man escape conviction, despite the clear thrust
of the law. Pugach may have seemed particularly
appropriate for such a bending of principle because
it involved pre-Mapp activities, with a possibly
difficult factual question as to whether defendant
had preserved the point.8 0 Moreover, if the de-
fendant had openly challenged the search initially,
the prosecution would have been free to indicate
the real basis therefore, and the ambiguity of
defendant's challenge may therefore have prej-
judiced the prosecution. On several counts, there-
fore, it seems likely that the case is sui generis.
Unfortunately, it has not been so interpreted.
The above history does not seem to have been
disclosed elsewhere, and the case has been cited8'
and relied upon as authorizing a very wide search
incident to a stop, a search virtually equivalent
to that incident to an arrest. Thus, in a recent
lower court decision, two men were stopped on
what the court found was reasonable suspicion of
theft of a portable television set and portable
phonograph. These items had been placed on a
-idewalk when the police arrived, together with
a tin box on top of the phonograph. The officer
questioned the defendant as to the phonograph
and television and then asked what was in the tin
29 Respondent's Notice of Motion and Brief for
Reargument in People v. Pugach, 4 (emphasis added).
80 Cf. People v. Friola, 11 N.Y.2d 157 (1961).
31 See, e.g., Am code 103; People v. Reason, 52 Misc.
2d 425, 276 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1966); Note,
50 Coa rcr L. Q. 529, 536 (1965); Note, 39 N.Y.U.L.
Rxv. 1093 (1964); Note, 78 Hagv. L. Rxv. 473, 476
(1964).
box. Defendant answered "personal papers" and
the officer "asked defendant Reason to open the
box" which he did, disclosing narcotics. At this
point, the defendant was placed under arrest.
The court upheld this search on the authority of
Pugach, saying
the fact that the contraband was found con-
cealed in a tin box carried by one of the de-
fendants rather than a briefcase, afforded no
ground for saying that this "frisk" was in
reality a constitutionally protected search.
I see no purpose anymore in splitting hairs
over the distinction between a frisk and a
search unless one applies the term "frisk" to
a search for weapons only. Pugach has
taken care of that! How does one pat a tin
box (such as was here described) for weapons
and, for that matter, a briefcase?
Assuming a weapon in a tin box such as was
here described, or in a briefcase-who can say
whether such a weapon is not as readily acces-
sible as it might be, were it lodged in a pocket
of a suspect's clothing I"
In one respect, there was more danger here than in
Pugach, for the box was not sealed. But the
Combined Council Guidelines alternative of put-
ting the box out of the defendant's reach was
equally available. Moreover, the danger issue
is patently meretricious for here the officer was
so dearly unconcerned about his safety that he
had the defendant himself open the "dangerous"
box!" At this point, there seems little difference
between a search incidental to an arrest and a
2People v. Reason, 52 Misc. 2d at 436, 276 N.Y.S.2d
at 207-08 (emphasis added).
"An equally permissive attitude appears in dictum
in another New York case, People v. Cassesse, 47 Misc.
2d 1031 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1965). There, the court found
that defendants, who were suspected of having fired
a shot, had been properly arrested upon probable
cause and frisked, after being ordered from their car.
After the frisk, the car was searched and a loaded
pistol found. The search was initially upheld on the
authority of United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132
(1928, but the court went on to say,
"Even without arresting the defendants at that
hour in the morning on a public street, the police
had the right to momentarily detain, question and
'frisk' them. [citing Rivera, Peters, and § 180-a.]
Such 'frisk,' under the facts in this case, could law-
fully extend to the automobile. (People v. Pugach,
14 N.Y.2d 65.)" 47 Misc.2d at 1033-34.
Although there may be a qualifier in "under the facts
of this case," it does seem as if the court is sanctioning
a search of a car when there is merely suspicion of its
occupants. Thus, if the police have nothing more than
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"frisk" incidental to a "stop" as the court in the
latter case recognized.
34
The New York Court of Appeals' most recent
stop and frisk opinion in People v. Taggar 35
virtually obliterates the distinction between a
search and a frisk, and quite explicitly. There,
police received an anonymous telephone tip that
a "male, white youth on the corner of 135th and
Jamaica Avenue", described further as being 18,
and having "blue eyes, blond hair", and wearing
"white chino-type pants", had a "loaded .32
caliber revolver in his left hand jacket pocket".
The police went to the spot, saw defendant among
a group of children, "put him against the wall and
took the revolver out of his left-hand jacket
pocket".
The prosecution's primary contention was that
the arrest and search were based on probable
cause. Although the Court of Appeals rejected
this argument, it upheld the search on the basis
of the stop and frisk provision. Judge Breitel,
speaking for 6 members of the court, first found
that there was reasonable suspicion to stop under
the first paragraph of the provision. As to the
distinction between a "frisk" and a "search",
he said:
A difficulty is that both the Peters and
Rivera cases held that the "permissible search"
following the "stop" allowed under common
law and section 180-a should be limited to a
"frisk"---"a patting of the exterior of one's
suspicion, and if the suspects are found in a car and
frisked, apparently any weapons-or perhaps some-
thing else?-found in the car may be used against them.
Another lower court decision in New York may also
have relied on Pvgach to sanction a search that was
far more than a touch of the exterior. In People v.
Norris, 46 Misc.2d 44, 258 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct.
Kings 1965), an officer saw a suspect wearing a glove
on his left hand. The suspect "put his right hand under
the glove or up the left-hand sleeve." According to the
officer's affidavit, he searched the glove and found two
brown envelopes which were found to contain 26 mari-
juana cigarettes. Although the facts are not too clear,
it is hard to see how a "frisk" for self-protection could
justify opening these envelopes. Compare People v.
Vasquez, 43 Misc.2d 1058 (Dist. Suff. 1966), discussed
at n.43 below, and People v. Rodriguez, 47 Misc.2d
551, 556 (Nass. Cty. 1965). It is possible, of course,
that upon taking hold of the envelopes, the officer
gained probable cause to open them on the ground
that he had good reason to believe such envelopes
are used to hold narcotics, see People v. Battle, 12
N.Y.2d 866 (1962). The case was not, however, de-
cided on that ground, but in reliance on _Pugach and
§ 180-a, subd. 2. See 46 Misc. 2d at 45; 258 N.Y.S.2d
at 969.
N4 52 Misc. 2d at 436; 276 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
35 20 N.Y.2d 335 (1967).
clothing".... In fact, the Rivera case distin-
guished a "frisk" from a "full blown search"
and held that as the former was a lesser in-
vasion of privacy, it "may be justified as an
incident to inquiry upon grounds of elemental
safety and precaution which might not ini-
tially sustain a search..."
In the case at bar, it it clear that Delaney
did not frisk defendant. As the detective had
been told that the pistol was in defendant's
left-hand jacket pocket, he chose to make an
immediate search of that area rather than
engaging in the routine frisk. Under the
circumstances this may well have been the
correct procedure, or at least a reasonable
alternative procedure, but it probably ex-
ceeded the limitations of the Peters and Rivera
opinions.
The fact remains, however, that in all but
one of the Court's decisions on this point, the
arresting officers engaged in "searches" rather
than "frisks" in order to obtain inculpating
evidence.... Even in People v. Peters (supra),
where the officer initially frisked the defendant
and felt something hard, this Court held that
the officer did not have "probable cause"
to make the arrest until he had actually
reached into the defendant's pocket, with-
drew, and identified the burglars' tools. In
the Rivera case, on the other hand, the Court
found that the officer had probable basis to
search the defendant's pocket once the frisk
had revealed the likely presence of a weapon.
In short, there is ample authority to uphold
the legality of the search in this case.
Even assuming that under normal circum-
stances the "search" allowed by section 180-a
should be limited to a "frisk", the action of the
detective in this case was proper, because of
the additional circumstances. Delaney had
a reasonably based suspicion not only that
defendant was carrying a pistol but also that
the weapon was located in his left-hand
jacket pocket. It would seem unreasonable to
require an officer in that stituation to engage
in a preparatory and undoubtedly dangerous
frisk-particularly in vLw of the fact that
defendant was standing in the middle of a
group of children at the time of the search.3
The reason for limiting the search to a frisk,
however, is to reduce the invasion of privacy
'A Id. at 342-43.
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when there is no probable cause, and not because
of a lack of reasonable suspicion as to where the
weapon is. In every case in which a frisk is
legally permitted under the "stop and frisk"
provision there must be reasonable suspicion that
a weapon is somewhere on the suspect's person
and, as Judge Breitel recognized, the frisk is
permitted in order to verify this suspicion only
because the court considered it merely "a minor
inconvenience".7 Judge Breitel's opinion appar-
ently rejects this rationale. Moreover, his review
of the prior New York cases as involving searches
rather than mere frisks and his reliance on them
for authority, indicate that even where there is
no such reasonable suspicion of the weapon's
specific location, a full-blown search has been and
will be allowed. His apparently approving cita-
tion of the ALT Code provision under which "the
'search' need not be confined to a 'frisk'" rein-
forces this conclusion.38
The consequences of this are obvious, and were
noted by Judge Fuld in his dissent:
The Fourth Amendment, guaranteeing
"protection of privacy" . . . means nothing
if anyone may be searched at any time simply
on the strength of an anonymous phone call-
made, perhaps, out of mischief or spite-de-
nouncing him to the police as being unlawfully
armed. A proper way to respond to such a
communication would be to stop and question
the suspect, .. . rather than to act, as if prob-
able cause had already been established.... 39
The two cases now before the Supreme Court
of the United States, People v. Peters and People v.
Sibron, were decided under the authority of both
Rivera and the statutory provision, and they com-
pletely emasculate the "reasonable suspicion of
danger" requirement of that statute. In Peters, an
off-duty police officer named Lasky, with his service
revolver drawn, ran after two suspiciously acting
men whom he saw on the sixth (top) floor of the
officer's apartment building. He caught up with
Peters on the stairway, grabbed him by the shirt
7 People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d at 464, 252 N.Y.S.2d
at 463.
s Al Code § 2.02 5; 20 N.Y.2d of 343 n.2. Such ap-
proval is hardly surprising since judge Breitel was one
of the most vigorous proponents of this provision at the
AmT meeting discussions. 43d Annual Proceedings,
American Law Institute 120-23, 135-38, 159 (1966)
(hereafter cited as "1966 ALI Proceedings.")
29 20 N.Y.2d at 345.
collar, and questioned him.' 0 After obtaining a
reply, he frisked Peters by "tapp[ing] his groin
pockets and under his arms ... looking for a
weapon". The frisking revealed "something hard",
which did not "seem like a gun", but "could have
been" a knife.4 Lasky put his hand in the defen-
dant's right pants pocket and brought out an opaque
plastic envelope, which was not sealed but through
which he could not see.4 The officer did not
know what the envelope contained and opening
it he found burglar's tools, for the possession of
which Peters was thereafter convicted.
It seems clear from the above facts that the
officer really had no good reason to think the hard
object was a weapon, except on the ground that
any object might be. And this may well be a
reasonable position. Knives obviously can be
small and dangerous, although it is difficult to
believe Lasky felt himself in very much danger
even from a knife, when he had his gun in his
hand. But if there is to be a right to invade a
suspect's clothing whenever anything hard is felt,
then it must be realized that the frisk will often
be more than an external "pat" or "feel", onerous
as even that may be, for many people carry hard
objects like pens, keycases, wallets and the like
which "could" or "may" be a weapon. After
Peters, there will be few occasions when an officer
will not feel justified in going into a suspect's
pockets if he feels something hard which "could
have been" and "may have" felt like a knife.
Further, there seems very little justification for
opening the opaque envelope for safety's sake-as
little as for opening Pugach's brief case or Reason's
tin box. Here again, the package could have been
40 Record on Appeal to Court of Appeals, People v.
Peters, 16.
41The officer described the episode as follows at the
preliminary hearing:
Q. Did your frisking reveal a weapon? A. I felt
something hard.
Q. The Court: You felt something hard in his
pocket. Did it seem like a gun? A. No.
Q. Did it seem to be the envelope that was re-
covered? A. I didn't know what it contained.
Q. Did it seem like some other weapon? A. It
could have been.
Q. Did it feel like a knife? A. It may have.
Q. Did it feel like a knife? A. It could have been.
Q. Were you able to feel the length of this object,
this hard object which you ay was in the de-
fendant's pocket? A. No.
Q. Were you able to feel as to its width? A. No.
Id. at 26-27.
42 !d. at 21, 23.
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put out of the suspect's reach until the matter
was disposed of.4
Peters is therefore doubly significant with respect
to searches: it first allows the police to go into a
person's pockets for anything hard which "could"
or "may" be a weapon, which includes almost
anything, and it then allows them to open what-
ever is found."
Peters also makes it clear that the right to search
under the statutory provisions can be invoked
whenever a stop is made, just as with a frisk
under Rivera. At the opening of the Rivera
opinion, the court seemed to draw a distinction
between the statutory provision, which requires
the conjunction of both reasonable suspicion of
certain crimes and reasonable suspicion of danger
to the officer before a search may be made, and
"the case now presented". In view of the latitude
given the police by Rivera to search anytime they
stop, this comparison may have implied that by
requiring reasonable suspicion of danger the
legislature had given the police less power to
search than they had had without the statute,
hardly a result contemplated by the legislature
or by anyone else. Peters, however, scotched
this possible interpretation. Though talking the
language of reasonable suspicion of danger, the
Court said:
The frisk is necessary on grounds of elemental
safety. Even when the policeman has the upper
hand, the tables are easily turned.45
If tables may be "easily turned" even when an
officer has his gun out, then surely the search will
almost never be held unjustified. Thus, under
both the statute and the common law, a policman
may search whenever he stops.
In many ways, Sibron is an even more troubling
case. According to the police officer's testimony,
43 Compare People v. Vasquez, 51 Misc.2d 1058
(Dist. Ct. Suffolk 1966), an analogous situation where
the court authorized a search to divest a person ar-
rested for a traffic violation of property, while at the
jail house, and held that the Correction Law and
regulations authorized such a search. The court further
held, however, that such a search would not permit
police officers to open two manila envelopes which
defendant had on him, and which were found to con-
tain marijuana. Id. at 1061-63.
41 Although the opinion does note that the envelope
was "unsealed", there is little reason to think this
fact made a difference since the envelope was closed,
especially in light of Pugach. Interestingly enough,
however, Judge Keating nowhere cited Pugach as
authority for the officer's conduct.
45 18 N.Y.2d at 245; 273 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
he had had the defendant Sibron under surveil-
lance for some eight hours, during which he saw
him talking to numerous addicts. At about mid-
night, the officer called Sibron out of a restaurant
where the latter had been talking to some known
addicts and said, again according to the officer,
"You know what I am looking for". Sibron
mumbled something, reached into his pocket, and
"held something in his hand", at which point the
officer reached in and grabbed some metal tin
foil which contained heroin. The officer described
the scene as follows:
The Witness: At the same time I told him
to take his hand out of his pocket, at the same
time I reached in with him and inside his
pocket I saw in his hand and in his pocket he
was ready to grab this cellophane-actually,
it was metal tin foil wrapper.
Q. Did you see what it was in his hand at the
time? A. I asked him what it was.
Q. What did he do with it? A. I grabbed it
off him.
Q. Did he attempt to throw it away? A.
Yes, sir. He was reaching in his pocket
to throw it out.
46
On "cross-examination" by the prosecution,47 the
officer testified as follows to a clearly suggestive
question:
Q. When he reached into his pocket, you
didn't think he was reaching for a weapon?
A. I thought he might have been.
Q. But he came up with a piece of tin foil;
didn't he? A. Yes.
Q. And that's when you grabbed his hand?
A. Well, he had his hand in his pocket.
I put my hand in his pocket. At that
time I caught him with his hand in his
pocket.
Q. Just prior to that, you asked if he had
something to give you? A. I said, "You
know what I am looking for". He mum-
bled something and reached into his
pocket. 4s
The trial judge, who saw the issue solely as one
of probable cause to arrest and so decided it,
summarized the situation as follows:
46 Record on Appeal to Court of Appeals, People v.
Sibron 18.
41 The officer was called as the court's witness after
the prosecutor refused to call him. Id. at 12.
48 Id. at 19.
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... here is a police officer, known by the de-
fendant to be a police officer. The police
officer advances toward the defendant and
says, "You know what I am looking for".
The defendant-may it not be so-was over-
come or overawed by a show of authority of
a police officer who asks him pointblank or
says to him pointblank, "I am looking for
contraband". The defendant reaches into
his pocket and is about to take it out, the
facts there are just as consistent with the
interpretation he is about to take it out and
hand it to the police officer, the police officer
intercepted him.
49
He then found probable cause, clearly incor-
rectly, 50 and it was only on appeal that the Dis-
trict Attorney sought to justify the search under
Rivera and the statutory provision.
On this record, it is clear that not only was
there no reason whatsoever to suspect danger,
but that no one even considered that possibility,
except when the issue was fleetingly introduced
by the prosecution, obviously as a precaution.
Indeed, if the officer thought that he was in any
danger, would he not have made the frisk him-
self, as was done in Rivera? Surely, he would
not have ordered the "dangerous" suspect to
hand over something which was not in the suspect's
hand at the time, 51 thereby requiring him to go
into his pockets and obtain access to whatever
weapons might be there. A bona fide frisk for
safety involves keeping the suspect's hands out
of his pockets, not in them. 2 Indeed, the officer
himself described his understanding of Sibron's
actions as "reaching in his pocket to throw it
OUt".1
Sibron also points up the fact that in many of
these cases the officer is not really interested in
an interrogation.- In calling Sibron out, the
9 Id. at 21-22.
50 The judge relied on the fact that the defendant
was an addict even though there was no evidence that
the officer knew this. Id. at 22.
-,Id. at 16.
52The same analysis of course applies to Reason,
where the officer had the defendant himself open a
closed box, instead of keeping this "dangerous" item
away from the defendant by either putting the box
aside or by the officer's opening it himself. Compare
DETECTION 48.
w Record on Appeal to Court of Appeals, People v.
Sibron, 18.
54This may also have been true in Rivera and in
Norris where no questions were asked before the search,
although it is possible that in those cases, the officers
searched first to protect themselves, assuming arguendo
that there was a realistic suspicion of danger.
officer asked no questions at all but simply said
"You know what I am looking for", 55 and the
search followed immediately when the suspect
attempted to comply. This may be quite typ-
ical, 56 for the post-stop "frisk" is generally used
for much more than self-protection. It is used
(1) to seek evidence; (2) to prevent crime by the
confiscation of weapons; and (3) to establish the
policman's authority on the streets.
The policeman's understandable desire to search
for evidence without having to comply with the
probable cause requirement is well-known. As
Jerome Skolnick puts it, police "would like to be
able to search first and then arrest on the basis
of the incriminating evidence disclosed by the
search".Y The American Bar Foundation study
has documented the numerous pretexts police
have adopted for searching,2 and the reports
contain many -such cases.59 Traffic and vagrancy
arrests, drinking, curfew, and other minor viola-
tions, searches prior to arrest where probable
cause to arrest is ultimately found 6 -the wide-
spread use of these attests to the policeman's
attempt to get around restrictions on his power
to search at will."'
Sibron is a very good example of such a pre-
arrest search for evidence and the New York
cases as a group provide a revealing list of items
seized in a stop and frisk; narcotics (Sibron,
Reason, Norris); burglar's tools (Peters); and four
guns (Rivera, Teams, Taggart and Cassesse).
12
In all the gun cases but Rivera--and perhaps even
there, as noted earlier-the very purpose of
the stop and search was to find a gun whose
45 18 N.Y.2d at 603. Compare People v. Matera. 45
Misc.2d 864, 258 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1st Dept. 1965) (where
officers "directed" defendant to empty his pockets,
his compliance was held to be coerced and the sub-
sequent arrest annulled.)
56The American Bar Foundation study concluded
that the decision to question was dependent on many
factors, but the decision to search was based on only
four-"race, sex, time, and location." DETECTION 41.
57 SKOLNICK 216.
5 DETECTION 122; see generally Ch. 9.
59 See e.g. Taglavore v. U.S., 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir.
1961); People v. Sapp. 43 Misc.2d 81 (Erie Cty. 1964);
Lohman and Misner, I The Police and the Community
37 (1966) (San Diego) (This 2-volume study of San
Diego and Philadelphia will hereafter be cited as "San
Diego Study" and as "Philadelphia Study" respectively.
It was prepared for the President's Commission.)
60 Police often misstate the sequence of events in
order to sustain the search. DETECTION 128; SKOLNICK
144.
61Id. at 217.
6 Three other cases did not involve a frisk and
Pugach really involved a search incidental to an ar-
rest, as earlier indicated.
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existence the police anticipated, and it was not
found as a by-product of a self-protective measure
incident to an inquiry, as ostensibly contemplated
by the statute. This could hardly be mere acci-
dent,61 and in fact, New York was cited by the
President's Crime Commission Task Force Report
for the proposition that "searches are made in a
high proportion of instances not for the purpose
of protecting the officer but to obtain drugs or
other incriminating evidence".U
Another reason for the police desire to search
is to confiscate knives and weapons, also one of
the major purposes of the aggressive patrol work
so widely used for crime prevention in high crime
areas. This is good public relations and most police
apparently feel that such confiscation helps to pre-
vent crime.65 The American Bar Foundation study
found that consequently any mare on the streets in
a high-crime area "is likely to be searched several
times ... a year".66 Parolees, "known criminals"
and juveniles are often likely to be searched on
sight for weapons,6 and in one night, an officer
can confiscate 30 to 40 knives.
The reference to juveniles raises the third
major purpose of the search: the policeman's
oft-noted need to maintain authority on the
streets against the competing claims of juvenile
gangs and others. 68 A recent study of the Phila-
delphia police stressed the importance of the
"fight for the corner" in order to assert the police-
man's authority and establish respect, especially
where the young officer is concerned. This "fight"
often produces stops, shakedowns, and arrests,
particularly of youths, and often without probable
0 See Kuh, supra n. 4 at 35. ("Concealed non-bulky
contraband is not ordinarily legally discoverable to
such a search .... ") Figures supplied to me by the
New York Police Department indicate that in 2Y2
years (July 1964-Dec. 1966), out of 1142 stops and
885 frisks, only 69 weapons-guns, knives and bayonets
(!)-were obtained. Letter to author from Ellsworth A.
Monahan, Director, Legal Bureau, Police Department,
City of New York (Feb. 8, 1967). The figures are, how-
ever, highly suspect, for it is almost impossible to be-
lieve that there were only 1142 stops in New York in
2j'2 years when there were over 200,000 reported an-
nually in San Diego. Police Task Force 184. The
figures are so defective in other regards that it does not
seem worth reproducing them.
64 Police Task Force 185.
65 For the doubts, see DETECTION 190, 195, 197-98.
For public support see San Diego Study 38, 51, 177.
66 DETECTION 190.
6 7 Id.
18 Police Task Force 183; Reiss and Bordua, Environ-
ment and Organization: A Perspective on the Police, in
THE POLICE 25, 47-48 (Bordua ed. 1966); Werthman &
Piliavin, Gang Members and the Police, in id. at 56, 92
(hereafter cited as "Werthman and Piliavin").
cause. 9 The "shakedown" is a favored method
of maintaining discipline,70 and it dovetails nicely
with self-protection and confiscation of weapons
in an explosive situation.
In light of these other reasons for searching,
much of the support for frisk powers for self-
protection seems irrelevant and unrealistic, for
the pure self-protection frisk actually seems quite
rare.
The foregoing review indicates that the "frisk"
is not a carefully circumscribed protective device
that is sparingly invoked, but a wide-ranging and
serious intrusion used for gathering evidence.
confiscation of weapons and the maintenance of
discipline. Judge Van Voorhis' discription of what
the Court of Appeals authorized in Rivera and Pu-
gach is quite accurate: the policeman may search
"almost at will",' because a search is permitted in
New York whenever a stop is made and perhaps
even when there is no forcible stop, as on the
record facts in Pugach. The reference in the
statute to "reasonably suspects ... danger" is
not a meaningful limitation on when a search
may be made, for it has been read out of the
statute, leaving as the only remaining limita-
tion that which is imposed on the power to stop-
"reasonable suspicion" of criminality. Analysis
of how this standard has been applied in New York
and elsewhere shows, however, that this provision
also imposes no significant control on the police-
man's power to stop and search, and to this we
now turn.
The Power to Stop on "Reasonable Suspicion"
Few tests are more vague, uncertain and mini-
mal than the "reasonably suspects ... crime"
prerequisite to a stop under § 180-a. The New
York Combined Council Guidelines stress that
"reasonable suspicion" is "dearly" more than
"mere suspicion", but how can one objectively
define and apply this "dear" difference be-
tween them? The difference is, in fact, anything
but "clear". Thus far, only one New York case
out of the twelve reported has found that an
officer acted without "reasonable suspicion",n
69 Philadelphia Study 132, 142-46, 168-69; San
Diego Study 88.
70 See e.g., Werthman & Piliavin 62.
71 People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d at 608 (dissent).
2 In People v. Anonymous, 48 Misc.2d 713, 265
N.Y.S.2d 705 (Cty. Ct. Nas. 1965) an officer saw a boy
walking on a Sunday afternoon in July, at 5:00 P.M.
in Hicksville, Long Island, carrying a box of books.
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and some police officers with whom the case was
discussed found the facts quite suspicious. The
Guidelines give an example of "reasonable sus-
picion" but this too is of little help, for the facts
given are so fulsome as to satify the requirements
of probable cause." Indeed, the police themselves
have been said to be unable to make their stand-
ards objective,74 and the proposed ALl Code does
not even try; it allows a forcible stop whenever
"circumstances .. . suggest" criminality, without
indicating to whom or how strongly.
75
Nor can an effort at an objective and significant
set of limitations even be expected, for if any such
restraints were attempted, the only result would
be police confusion and irritation, with more
complaints about tying the hands of the police.
The officer called the boy over and asked him where
he'd gotten the books. The boy said he'd found them
outside a school and offered to give them to the officer.
The officer, unsatisfied, had the boy accompany the
officer to the school. It turned out subsequently that
the boy had burglarized the school. The court found
that the officer had no basis for his suspicion. Compare
People v. Simon, 290 P.2d 531 (Cal. 1955).
71 The victim of a mugging describes her assaillant
as six feet tall, wearing a brown leather jacket. Shortly
thereafter police see a man hurrying down a dark street,
looking furtively around and clutching something under
his brown jacket. He is, however, only five feet tall, and
the Guidelines assert that the difference in height pre-
cludes the existence of probable cause. It is well-es-
tablished, however, that a mistake does not necessarily
preclude probable cause, see, e.g., United States ex rel.
Wilson v LaVallee, 367 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1966); United
States v. Brown, 365 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 976) (mistake
of 6" as to height and as to clothing); United States v.
Kuntz, 265 F. Supp. 543, 547-48 (N.D.N.Y. 1967), and
the facts given seem more than enough for probable
cause. The example may have been designed to give
the impression that stop and frisk would be used pri-
marily in those cases where there would be probable
cause but for the absence of one detail. See Note, 78
H.v. L. REv. 473, 475 (1964).
It should be noted, incidentally, that the suspicion
must relate to the actual or possible commission of
only certain crimes. The cases, however, rarely mention
the specific crime, and in some, at least, it seems likely
that none was specifically contemplated. See, e.g.,
Norris, supra, where officer saw two men walking at
3:00 a.m. in downtown Brooklyn. When the officer ap-
proached, one ran away, and the other suddenly put his
hand to his sleeve. The court held that the officer had
reasonable suspicion about the commission of "one of
the crimes above specified," and he was therefore au-
thorized to search "for a dangerous weapon." 46 Misc.
2d at 45. The nature of the crime was never specified.
In most of the cases, however, burglary was probably
involved. Compare DETEcToN 31, n. 18 ("courts...
do not seem to require any certainty with respect to
what offense is suspected.")
74 DETECTIo\' 39-41, 93.
75 The dictionary definition of "suggest" is "to call to
mind by association of ideas." Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary (7th Ed.) (1965). One needn't have read
Joyce to be aware of the limitless possibilities made
available by "suggest."
Instead, police judgment will probably be followed
in almost all cases, for what else can the judge
really do? Suspicion involves so low a degree of
belief and so subjective a judgment that it is
impossible for him to draw a line between a "mere"
suspicion and a "reasonable" suspicion, especially
if the officer whos conduct is under review is an
experienced patrolman, which the judge almost
never is.
Indeed, deference to police expertise is now
mandatory in New York both for applying stop
and frisk and for probable cause. In Peters, Judge
Keating declared:
By requiring the reasonable suspicion of a
police officer, the statute incorporates the po-
lice officer's intuitive knowledge and appraisal
of the appearances of criminal activity. His
evaluation of the various factors involved in-
sures a protective, as well as definitive, stand-
ard.76
Thus, we must now look to the policeman's
judgment of what is suspicious for our protection
against his misjudgment. And in People v. Val-
entine," the Court of Appeals found probable
cause to arrest on events which admittedly ap-
peared innocuous to a layman on the ground that
they appeared otherwise to a policeman. Surely,
this is a long way from Mr. Justice Jackson's
distrust of the policeman's judgment because he is
"engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime".78
Mr. Justice Jackson's distrust was sound, for
police judgment is not likely to be overly discrim-
inating. Recent field studies by Skolnick, the
American Bar Foundation, and many others
79 have
catalogued the many innocent events that are
suspicious to a policeman. These studies and
police training materials like Bristow's Field In-
terrogation point up the underlying principle of
these judgments: anything out of the ordinary
is suspicious. Because of the element of danger
in his work, "the policeman is generally a 'sus-
picious' person"; "he must be suspicious of
strangeness, oddity, indeed any sort of change."
76 18 N.Y.2d at 245.
- 17 N.Y.2d 128 (1966).
78 United States v. Johnson, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
79 See, e.g., Specter, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora's Box
for the Prosecutor, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 4, 18-19 (1962);
Note, 9 UTAH L. R v. 593 (1965); Note, 100 U. PA. L.
RLv. 1182 (1952); as well as generally SKOLNICK;




"It is in the nature of the policeman's situation
that his conception of order ... is . .. shaped by
persistent suspicion.... A young man may sug-
gest the threat of violence to the policeman by
his manner of walking or 'strutting' ... ,8 A
policeman's magazine quoted by Skolnick listed
the following, among many others, as "subjects
who should be subjected to field interrogation":
1. Suspicious persons known to the officer
from previous arrests, field interrogations,
and observations.
5. Known trouble-makers near large gath-
erings.
6. Persons who attempt to avoid or evade
the officer.
7. Exaggerated unconcern over contact
with the officer.
8. Visibly "rattled" when near the police-
man....
16. Hitchhikers.
17. Person wearing coat on hot days.
20. Many others. How about your own
personal experiences? 8'
The Combined Council Guidelines contain a sim-
ilarly broad list of so-called suspicious circum-
stances.8 2 "Merely being alone in certain areas
'is one of the factors contributing to his being
8 0 Quoted from SKoLNicK, 65, 44-48. See also WERET-
mSAN & PiLiAviN 56.
11 A complete list, which is taken from Adams, Field
Interrogation, Police (March-April 1965), p. 28, is
quoted at SKOLNICK 45 n.5. See also DETECTION 39-40,
discussed below.
82 Combined Council Guidelines 1.B.3.b. lists the
following:
i. The demeanor of the suspect.
ii. The gait and manner of the suspt.
ii. Any knowledge the officer may have of the
suspect's background or character.
iv. Whether the suspect is carrying anything, and
what he is carrying.
v. The manner in which the suspect is dressed,
including bulges in clothing-when consid-
ered in light of all of the other factors.
vi. The time of the day or night the suspect is ob-
served.
vii. Any overheard conversation of the suspect.
viii. The particular streets and areas involved.
ix. Any information received from third persons,
whether they are known or unknown.
x. Whether the suspect is consorting with others
whose conduct is "reasonably suspect."
xi. The suspect's proximity to known criminal
conduct.
(This listing is not meant to be all inclusive.)
suspect' "83 As a result, it has been quite easy
for the New York police to meet the standards of
"reasonably suspects.., crime". The New York
cases have relied on such factors as the lateness of
the hour, the level of neighborhood crime,14 the sus-
pect's attempt to leave the scene upon seeing a
policeman, a sudden movement,8
5 walking back
and forth in front of a restaurant at night,
88 and
talking to known addicts.8Y In some of these
cases, of course, several of these factors were
present, but in others there was very little.
88
In addition, there is the factor of race. As
Werthman and Piliavin put it:
From the front seat of a moving patrol car,
street life in a typical Negro ghetto is per-
ceived as an uninterrupted sequence of sus-
picious scenes. Every well dressed man or
woman standing aimlessly on the street during
hours when most people are at work is care-
fully scrutinized for signs of an illegal source
of income; every boy wearing boots, black
pants, long hair, and a club jacket is viewed
as potentially responsible for some item on
the list of muggings, broken windows, and
petty thefts that still remain to be cleared;
and every hostile glance directed at the pas-
sing patrolman is read as a sign of possible
guilt.89
Such discriminatory practices are not limited to
high-crime urban areas, but, as shown by an un-
published study by a CORE chapter in Oregon,
they can exist in so pastoral a setting as Eugene,
Oregon. 98 One observer comments that it is only
recently that police have found that "because a
8 Goldstein, Administrative Problems In Controlling
The Exercise of Police Authority, 58 J. Cam. L., C. &
P. S. 160, 165 (1967).
4 People v. Rivera.
8 5 People v. Norris, 46 Misc.2d 44, 258 N.Y.S.2d
967, 968 (Sup. Ct. Kings 1965).86 People v. Rivera.
87 People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d at 603.
83 E.g., id. at 603.
89 Werthman & Piliavin 56; Police Task Force, 164,
1964; Edwards, Order and Civil Liberties: A Complex
Role for the Police, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 47, 54 (1965).
90 The study found that Negroes are more likely to
be stopped more often even after discounting for class
and criminal record. It was found that 52% of the
Negroes in the sample were stopped and only 3% of
the whites. Further, that Negroes averaged 1.1 stops
for a 15-month period and whites only .08, a ratio of
more than 10:1. See Report of Community Relations
Committee, Eugene Chapter, CORE, on Police Harass-
ment in Eugene (mimeo, undated) (the data covers the
period Nov. 1963-Feb. 1965).
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Negro walks on the streets of an exclusively white
neighborhood it is not legal 'reasonable grounds'
for assuming he has commited a crime, much
less that a crime has been committed". 9 Negro
juveniles are particularly prone to suspicion, es-
pecially if found in white neighborhoods, or sim-
ply lounging around, as so many of them do for
lack of employment or other reasons.92 Also
stopped frequently in some areas are inter-
racial couples, and those who look in the least
bit eccentric, "hip", or "beat".
93
Equally high on the list of suspicious persons
are known criminals and parolees often regarded by
the authorities as "police property"." In part,
this is because of the way police apparently do
much of their detective work: if a crime has been
committed, they often go right to those who are
known to have been in similar trouble before. 95
Moreover, by the nature of his work, the police-
man must work by stereotypes, by general judg-
ments about people. He has to forego making
fine distinctions among them.96 Thus, any young
male Negro or lower class person in a high-crime
neighborhood, or even a middle-class person in
a minority neighborhood, is likely to be viewed
with suspicion, particularly if his demeanor is
hostile or fearful. The police will often act on
the basis of furtive glances, nervousness, walking
away, and the like,9' and they will sometimes
test for such responses by staring at a possible
suspect.9s They will often be upheld by the courts,
too, as Rivera, Norris, and other cases in New
York and elsewhere show.
9' McNamara, Uncertainties in Police Work: The
Relevance of Police Recruits' Backgrounds and Training,
in THE PoLIcE 163,165 (Bordua ed. 1966) (hereafter
cited as "McNamara").
92Cf. Werthman & Piliavin 57-59.
93 San Diego Study 106, 65, 67.
94 This can include known gamblers and prostitutes.
Goldstein, supra n.83 at 164. See BRisTow 123 for justi-
fication of this practice. See Kamisar Book Review, 76
HAxv. L. REv. 1502, 1509-10 (1963) for "police prop-
erty" problems in connection with arrests for investiga-
tion, which are obviously closely related to stop and
frisk. The illegality of such arrests is clear, however.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S., 436,482 (1966); Kamisar,
supra.
95 Werthman & Piliavin 69. With juveniles, this can
include those with families that are often in trouble.
Id. at 73-74.
96 Skolnick 67; McNamara 170-71.
07DETEcTioN 32 ("a person who manifests concern
for the presence of the police, who repeatedly glances
at the officer, who changes his direction in an apparent
attempt to avoid confronting the officer, or who flees
at the sight of the officer will commonly be detained
and questioned."); Id. at 191.
98 Werthman & Piliavin 80; DETECTION 191.
Of course, the police are often justified and
right.9 9 The people they suspect are often in-
volved in criminal activity. But they are also
often wrong, and for reasons related to their opera-
tional procedures and roles. For example, it was
found that Philadelphia police over-estimated the
proportion of arrests involving Negroes in the
districts in which the officers were assigned.'
Partly, this is because the police concentrate on
patrolling poor neighborhoods, as a result of which
they see more of the crime that occurs there than
occurs in middle or upper-class areas.10' Also,
police often have very little familiarity with the
ghetto area, in which they do not live and which
they fear, sometimes referring to it as "the jungle".
An assignment to a ghetto area is usually con-
sidered undesirable and is sometimes used for
disciplinary reasons, the "department's worst"
being assigned there.'0 2 Moreover, in most places,
police have become motorized and extremely busy
so that they have little personal contact with the
residents except at moments of trouble. With
rotating shifts, they are often out of the neighbor-
hood before they have a chance to get to know the
residents, and "as a result, the same persons will
be stopped repeatedly by different officers." '5'
They are thus always fearful, ill at ease, and
suspicious, for the white policeman in a Negro
neighborhood-and most policemen in such areas
are still white'L-knows that there is little love
lost between him and the residents.' 0' Such sus-
picions are compounded by the very real and
sincere belief of most policemen that most Negroes
are somehow involved in crime.'"6 And finally, some
police departments have set field interrogation
quotas. 07
9 See letter from Dean Edward L. Barrett to Jerome
Skolnick, quoted in SEoLNrc 218-19.
'00 Kephart, Negro Visibility, 19 AmxE. Soclo. REv.
464 cited in McNamara 167-68, Task Force Report on
Crime And Its Impact; An Assessment, The President's
Commission 5 (hereafter cited as "Crime Impact Task
Force").
101 Werthman & Piliavin 82.
12 Police Task Force 165-66; San Diego Study 53;
Philadelphia Study 162.
10 Police Task Force 166; Id. at 52, 97, 132, 152, 162,
166; San Diego Study 161.
104The problem with Negro policemen can be even
worse. San Diego Study 93; Philadelphia Study 116;
Police Task Force 167.
105 Skolnick 49, (both British and American police
feel like "occupying soldier[s] in a bitterly hostile
country.")
06San Diego Study 121; Philadelphia Study 46,
48, 53, 64, 97.
'07 Police Task Force 189.
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In light of the above, it is hard to see how any
objective controls based on "reasonable suspicion"
could ever be developed, especially by a judge
removed from the street scene, and Judge Keating's
approach in Peters abandons any attempt to do so.
The only way probable cause itself may be kept
meaningful is by insisting on a certain threshliold
quantum of evidence which even a layman can
understand, while making some allowance for
police expertise, but when that threshhold is
reduced to "suspicion", there is room for almost
no control.108
This lack of objective standards and the inevit-
able "anything goes" result has a further trouble-
some consequence, the importance of which has
been highlighted by the recent riots. Stop and
frisk laws give the officer not only the power to
command a halt but also the right to use force to
enforce that command. Although attempts may be
made to prohibit the use of deadly force or even a
weapon as the ALT Code provides and as the
Combined Council Guidelines suggest, Peters al-
lowed the officer to point a gun, and the New York
cases at least hint at no limitation. And it is hard to
see how it could be otherwise, for how can one
enforce a stop against someone who vigorously
resists or flees by foot or by car, except by threaten-
ing or using substantial if not "deadly" force?
Stop and frisk may thus encourage policemen to
use force on many more occasions at a time when
the dangers inherent in such use are becoming
increasingly apparent and destructive.
Moreover, allowing this power may encourage
unnecessary and excessive force. It often happens
that a policeman brings in an arrestee who has
been badly beaten and the officer-sometimes with-
out a mark on him-claims that the beating was
necessary to subdue the citizen's wrongful re-
sistance to a lawful arrest. In some cases at least,
it seems clear that this claim is false, but the
citizen cannot disprove the officer's story and the
burden is almost always on the citizen, especially
where he is from a minority group and poor.
However, if the officer had no right to make an
arrest in the first place, his force was unauthorized
regardless of whether the citizen did in fact resist,
at least in many jurisdictions. Since the officer
103 "If probable cause is no longer to be the test, at
least at the initial point of arrest, where is the line to
be drawn short of indiscriminate police detentions or
hunch?" Foote, The Fourth Amezdtment: Obstacle or
Necessity in the Law of Arrest, in POLICE POWER AND
IxDIVIDUAL FREEDOm 29, 34 (Sowle ed. 1962).
knows this, he may refrain from assaulting the
person if he has no probable cause. But when the
officer is permitted to detain on suspicion, this
defense would be unavailable to a citizen, and he
would be forced to fall back on comparative credi-
bility, with its usual result. Legitimating the use of
force on suspicion would thus remove one of the
restraints on indiscriminate use of force by the
police. Whether this restraint is presently of sub-
stantial practical significance is impossible to say,
but it probably has some impact. And any grant to
the police of more power than they now have will
inevitably produce more legitimately and illegi-
timately used force.
It has been suggested, however, that (1) a
balancing test can be developed which will allow
stops where necessary but still avoid indiscriminate
use, and (2) the police should develop guidelines
and administrative regulations which will make
the standards objective. In an important article,
Dean Edward L. Barrett proposed that "the
reasonableness of each investigative technique
[should be determined] by balancing the seriousness
of the suspected crime and the degree of reasonable
suspicion possessed by the police against the
magnitude of the personal security and property
rights of the individual involved". 10
9 He then pro-
ceeded to analyze the Henry and Rios cases"
0
with this technique.
The prospect is, of course, attractive, although
it has never formally been adopted."' But how is
this to be applied in practice? Are all of these
subtle considerations to be balanced by the police-
man on the spot, in a matter of seconds or minutes,
subject to second guessing by the courts? If the
policeman's "balancing" turns out to produce
evidence of crime, how many courts will be ready
to find that he balanced wrongly, that there was
not enough suspicion for the crime suspected? The
109 Personal Rights, Property Rights and The Fourth
Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46, 63; see also Leagre,
The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J.
Crim. L., C. & P. S. 393, 413-416 (1963).
110 Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960);
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
M Justice Jackson's suggestion that "judicial excep-
tions to the Fourth Amendment... should depend some-
what on the gravity of the offense" is well known.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949)
(dissent). For recent support for such a test, see Stewart,
J. in Berger v. New York - U.S. -, 87 Sup. Ct. 1873,
1888 (1967) (concurrence). Cf. Camara v. Municipal
Court, - U.S. -, 87 Sup. Ct. 1727, 1735-36 (1967), id.
at 1742 (Clark J., dissenting) (different standard for
health searches, with "reasonableness ... still the ulti-
mate standard." id. at 1735-36.)
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Hall and Kamisar casebook raises the prospect
of frequent litigation of this issue, often leading to
reversals, or a possible reduction in the amount of
exclusion to a level below that necessary to main-
tain deterrence." 2 The latter is the more likely
prospect, especially in view of the difficult value
judgments involved in weighing the "seriousness of
the suspected crime"-often burglary or petit
larceny-against the "magnitude of the inva-
sion of" an individual's rights."3
Regardless of what position the courts take, so
vague a test as required by the "balancing"
approach will inevitably produce friction and
resentment, for there are bound to be incon-
sistent and confusing decisions."4 Police might
even prefer a flat denial of such broad powers, for
uncertainty can be a greater burden than having
to do without, and a "balancing" test ensures
permanent ambiguity.
Moreover, if meaningful restrictions are im-
posed by this approach, the pressures to weaken
them will quickly mount." 5 Professors Bator and
Vorenberg have commented that even a "reason-
able suspicion standard" may be too high in
certain circumstances." 6 A standard so vague and
112 HALL & KaItSAR, supra n.24 at 186.
"1 The difficulties can be seen in some of the Cali-
fornia cases. For example, in People v. Blodgett,
293 P.2d 57 (1956), two passengers were ordered out
of a taxi which they had separately entered while
the taxi was waiting outside a hotel at 3:00 A.MI. By
what objective calculus can one balance the intrusive-
ness of such police conduct against the suspiciousness
of the circumstances? Cf. the dissent of justice Carter,
id. at 59-60.
114 Police resentment toward the courts because
of the vagueness of probable cause is well known.
Such resentment is compounded when different courts
arrive at different results on similar facts, especially
when one of the courts is a federal habeas corpus court,
for this can also produce friction between the state
and federal courts.
'15 Compare the situation with probable cause,
discussed f.n. 123-126.
116 "There may be instances when an officer would
seem justified in stopping a person to ask a few ques-
tions relating to a crime, even though the officer has
no basis for suspecting him of that crime." Bator &
Vorenberg, Arrest, Detection, Interrogation and the
Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative
Solutions, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 62, 66 (1966). They
seem to have incorporated this thought in the right
to forcibly stop witnesses. § 2.02(1). However, a wit-
ness may be simply a prospective defendant as to
whom there is not even reasonable suspicion, and thus
the limitations will be weakened even more. Cf. People
v. Clayton, 28 A.D.2d 543,._N.Y.S.2d (2d Dept.
\T.Y. 1967). See also Edwards, 1966 ALI Proceedings
103 ("There will never be a time when a police officer
in any central part of any big city ... wouldn't have
reasonable cause to believe that a felony or misdemeanor
has been committed, and ... couldn't find it in his
uncertain as Dean Barrctt's can hardly be en-
forced strictly against strong pressures for lenient
application, especially in view of the notorious
reluctance of lower court judges to "tie the hands"
of the police. The history of the "voluntariness"
test for confessions in the state courts is ample
testimony of what can happen to an ambiguous
standard under such circumstances."6" In short, it
seems most unlikely that indiscriminate use of this
power will be prevented by such a test.
The other suggestion, strongly pressed by the
President's Crime Commission and its Police
Task Force, is that the police apply measures
of self-discipline and develop guidelines to limit
themselves." 7 This suggestion is equally fu-
tile for several reasons: First, police can hardly
be expected to restrict and curtail a long-standing
practice like stop and frisk which is based in part
on fear for their own safety. Secondly, as earlier
noted, the police are themselves unable to make
these standards objective. Thirdly, self-regulation
is one of the frailest of instruments for social
control in any context, not just police work. It is
especially feeble in the police context, for rela-
tively little supervision of the patrolman's actions
is attempted or is even possible. And fmally, how
can one expect self-imposed restrictions to have
any meaning when the New York courts, at least,
have undercut any attempt at self-regulation by
sanctioning conduct explicitly interdicted by
criteria proposed by law enforcement authorities?18
In actuality, the "reasonable suspicion" standard
merely legitimates whatever police do, and thus
Judge Keating could say in Peters, "courts have
had no difficulty in applying this standard."
The infrequent case where a policeman's stop is
deemed unauthorized will probably be quite
difficult to reconcile with the more permissive
heart to believe that any person has knowledge that
might... aid ... investigation of that crime.")
116. Way, The Supreme Court and State Coerced Con-
fessions. 12 J. PUB. L. 53 (1963).
117 President's Commission Report, 106; Police Task
Force 17, 23.
1The Combined Council "Stop and Frisk" Guide-
lines advise against opening a briefcase, I.D.6, but
see Pugach which sanctioned such conduct; they
advise against the use of a "weapon or nightstick in
any fashion," 1.B.1, and of stopping someone "in
the public portion of private buildings," I.B.2.b, but
see Peters which ignored both; they suggest that no
questions are to be asked until the officer has identified
himself as a police officer, § I.c.1 but see Peters and
many others; they suggest that the search always be
limited to a "frisk", but see Taggart.
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decisions and will only cause confusion and
resentment.
To sum up the New York law, there has been a
steady and overt relaxation of standards so that
"reasonable suspicion of criminality" can be
satisfied by virtually anything and serves pri-
marily to circumvent the requirements of probable
cause: "reasonable suspicion of danger" is always
present almost by definition; and the "self-
protective" search is no longer limited to a frisk.
This same kind of loosening can be seen by com-
paring Rivera with Peters and Sibron, with respect
to the standards for reasonable suspicion, and
Rivera with Taggart with respect to the intensity
of the search. And there is no reason to think that
the New York experience is or will be unique-
the inevitable looseness of the standards and the
ubiquitous judicial reluctance' to strike down
police conduct which turns up conclusive evidence
of crime ensures that this pattern will be repeated
elsewhere as courts get beyond the initial cases
raising the validity of such powers, which are
often, like Rivera, relatively strong for the prose-
cution.
We are told, however, that "the case for such a
provision is a convincing one"-that such au-
thority is not only beneficial but necessary.11 9
How "convincing" is this case?
THE CASE FOR STOP AND FRISK PowERs
The purported benefits from giving the police
the power to stop and frisk can be summarized as
these: (1) prevention of crime; (2) avoiding a
dilution of probable cause in arrest cases; (3)
avoiding the necessity of making an arrest;
(4) allowing an opportunity for exculpation; and
(5) reducing police lawlessness and frustration.
The special benefits to be achieved from the
frisk are: (1) reducing danger to the policeman;
and (2) crime prevention by confiscating knives,
guns and other weapons.
The Benefits from Stop and Frisk
Of the first five listed, a few can be disposed of
quickly. Thus, although the stop as an opportunity
for exculpation is emphasized by Judge Keating in
Peters, in most cases it hardly seems necessary
to force a man to stop in order to allow him to
exculpate himself. A request for cooperation, and
advice that the suspect has such an opportunity,
surely seems sufficient. And, of course, where the
119 ALl Code 95.
officers have probable cause, which is where there
is likely to be the greatest need for exculpation, a
forcible restraint is permissible. On the other hand,
if the suspect is fleeing, a restraint might be neces-
sary to allow exculpation, but flight, particularly
if the suspect refuses to obey a request to stop and
there are circumstances which really do call for an
exculpatory explanation, may well be deemed
enough for probable cause, though the matter is
not entirely clear and will be returned to again."'
In short, the suggestion that we allow one to be
forcibly deprived of his liberty so that he can try
to regain it is no more persuasive here than in other
interrogational situationsY.1
2
A somewhat more plausible argument is that if
police can stop on less than probable cause in
order to make an investigation, they will not be
inclined to make formal arrests so quickly with
all the unfortunate consequences of such actions.
As a corollary to this argument, the ALI draftsmen
contend that stop and frisk powers will relieve the
courts of pressure to water down probable cause in
order to uphold such arrests when the victims turn
out to be implicated in crime."' The second half of
this argument presupposes, however, that there is a
dear-cut and substantial difference between
probable cause and reasonable suspicion, with
probable cause having been kept at a definite
and high threshold. Unfortunately, experience
does not support this assumption. Even after
New York police were given stop and frisk powers,
the New York courts loosened probable cause to a
point where it now seems little more than a
relatively high degree of reasonable suspicion.
Thus, the Court of Appeals described a recent
case in which it found probable cause as follows:
In White the court held that there was prob-
able cause for an arrest without a warrant and
an incident search with no more in the record
"than a showing that a known addict holding
money in his hand and talking to the sus-
pected drug peddler quickly put the money
" People v. Jackson, 257 N.Y.S.2d- 73 (1st Dept.
1965); Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in
Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 493 n.40 (1963);
DETcTiON 32.
121 See ALI Code § 5.01 Commentary 170, implicitly
rejected in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 482; United
States v. Vita, 294 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 823 (1962). For judge Keating's comment, see
18 N.Y. 2d at 244.
I AI Code 97.
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away and left the scene when the detective
approached." 12
And in People v. Valetine, probable cause was
found on the following facts:
The arresting officer testified at the trial that,
on the afternoon of September 23, 1964, the
defendant was standing on a street corner in
Brooklyn. During a period of more than 20
minutes, from a vantage point 50 to 60 feet
away in a parked automobile, the officer ob-
served six unknown persons approach the
defendant. Each of these persons engaged
the defendant in a short conversation, and, at
the conclusion thereof, each was seen to hand
him money in bill form. On three of these
occasions the defendant was observed making
notations on a slip of paper. Then, at approxi-
mately 1:30 P.M., the officer approached
the defendant, identified himself as a police
offier, and placed him under arrest. The officer
testified that prior to the arrest he had not
overheard any of the conversations between
the defendant and the unknown persons, nor
was he able to see the notations made by the
defendant on the piece of paper.
And the court concluded:
Here each transaction observed by the officer
might have been seemingly innocent, but the
repeated pattern amounted to probable cause
in the eyes of an arresting officer who was
well versed in the behavior of a professional
policy operator.
Elsewhere the story is the same."2 Thus, allowing
officers to stop and frisk will not preserve a high
threshold for probable cause, for other forces and
- People v. Valentine, 17 N.Y.2d 128, 269 N.Y.S.2d
111 (1966); People v. White, 16 N.Y.2d 270, 266
N.Y.S.2d 100 (1965). How great a weakening of proba-
ble cause is entailed by Valentine and White can be
seen by comparing the underlying facts in these cases
with decisions like United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102 (1965), where a far more elaborate set of
facts was deemed sufficient only because the search was
based on a warrant, and Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948) and Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959), where more detailed factual foundations than in
the New York cases were deemed inadequate for prob-
able cause to arrest. For other watering down, see
People v. Schnitzler, 18 N.Y. 2d 457 (1966).
See, e.g., People v. Prewitt, 52 Cal.2d 330, 341
P.2d (1959); State v. Krogness, - Ore. -, 388 P.2d
120 (1963); United States v. Kuntz, 265 F.Supp.
543 (N.D.N.Y. 1967). For a Supreme Court contribu-
tion, see McCray v. Illinois, 87 S.Ct. 1056 (1967).
pressures are watering it downy.15 Moreover, inso-
far as the existence of stop and frisk does allow
probable cause to retain a relatively high threshold,
it does so by the simple device of allowing most of
what probable cause would allow, without re-
quiring that it be established, as the Pugach,
Sibron, and Taggart cases so clearly show. In each
of these cases, the action was originally justified
as based on probable cause, but when the support
therefor was ruled inadequate, the same con-
duct was upheld under the stop and frisk law."
6
Thus, probable cause was preserved by being cir-
cumvented and made irrelevant.
It is also unlikely that the availability of stop
and frisk will reduce the number of arrests, for if
the officer is dissatisfied with the answers he
gets from the stop, he will often arrest anyway,
even if only and wrongly on suspicion, or on a
vagrancy or loitering charge."' This may be
partly because some people cooperate out of fear
that they will be arrested if they do not,"' and
12 Part of the reason for the watering down in
White is that if probable cause had not been found in
those facts, the defendant would have been entitled
to the name of a confidential informant. A court's
desire to preserve the confidentiality of informers,
a vital aspect of sumptuary crimes enforcement, will
exert continuing pressures to weaken probable cause,
regardless of stop and frisk. By not requiring disclosure
of such informants where there is much evidence of
their past utility, McCray v. Illinois, supra, may relieve
the courts of the constitutional pressures.
It may also be noted that the Valentine facts con-
tains just a little more than an example of "probable
cause to interrogate" only, appearing in BRISTow 89.
In Valentine, money was passed, though not in the
example, but in the latter the suspect was a known
bookmaker.12
6 See, e.g., Sibron, Taggart and People v. Teams,
20 A.D. 2d 803 (2d Dep't), affd. 18 N.Y.2d 835 (1966),
where the search was upheld under § 180-a, when the
Court of Appeals found that there was no probable
cause for an arrest. See also Pugach, Hoffman and
Cassesse, supra. This may well have been the real rea-
son for the enactment of § 180-a, after Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). Steinberg, 1966 ALI Proceedings
166.
127 Police apparently believe they have a right to
arrest if they receive no cooperation. Id. at 57. For
vagrancy arrests, see Police Task Force 188, LAFAvE,
ARIEST 151, and Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional
Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, of
General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police
Officers, and the Like, 3 CRxn. L. BuLL. 205, 226-28
(1967). The New York Court of Appeals has recently
strick down a vagrancy statute, CODE CRIn. PROC.
§ 887 (1), partly because the use of a vagrancy law for
investigating crime violates New York conceptions of
due process. Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y. 2d 309, 315-16
(1967). The statute was soon to be superseded anyway,





the policeman may feel he must maintain this
impression. Whatever the reason, the Police Task
Force of the President's Crime Commission found
that the number of arrests for investigation and
suspicion remains deplorably high, despite their
clear illegality, and, one may add, despite the
widespread use of field interrogation. 129 More-
over, the recent loosening of probable cause will
also make for more arrests, undercutting what-
ever benefits may result from allowing detention
powers. 10 Thus, this argument seems as weak,
experientially, as the others.
The most weighty argument for the forcible
stop is its purported use for crime prevention.
Thus, it has often been said that many police
believe the stop and frisk power is both useful
and necessary to cut down on crime,13' and this
has now been accepted by the New York courts in
Rivera and Peters. This crime prevention effect
is supposed to operate in several ways: The first
was summarized by Bristow as follows:
The frequent stopping and questioning of
suspicious persons usually tends to reduce
the crime rate in a given district. Word travels
quickly by the criminal grapevine that a
certain area is being well patrolled. Criminals
rarely frequent areas where they are frequently
stopped for interrogation, and tend not to
choose such districts for criminal activity.j
3 2
The second, which looks to the removal and
confiscation of weapons from suspicious people,
has been touched on earlier and will be discussed
further below.
29 Task Force 186; see also LAFAVE, ARREST 354-
63. The Philadelphia and San Diego studies found a
vast number of arrests for harassment and other im-
proper purposes, such as for insolence, for refusal to
disperse, in order to assert the police officer's authority,
to check out an identification, to establish respect.
Philadelphia Study, 142-46, 152. See also Goldstein,
supra n. 83 at 169. It was also alleged that police will
often goad the young person into either an attack or
profanity, which will then produce a violent police
reaction. Philadelphia Study 165, 126, and nn.140
and 142 infra.
" One of the strongest factors discouraging in-
discriminate arrests appears to be the officer's reputa-
tion with his sergeant. It has been found that officers
lose face in their departments if they make too many
arrests which are later thrown out. Werthman &
Piliavin 92. It may be, however, that this applies pri-
marily to arrests which are intended to stand up.
13, DETECTION 3; San Diego Study 44, 46, 53, 64,
82, 139; Philadelphia Study 316.
132 Bristow 5.
Professor Remington, a not unsympathetic
student of field interrogation, 3 3 has recently
evaluated these arguments as follows:
It is probable that an aggressive program
of preventive patrol does reduce the amount
of crime on the street, though it is a significant
comment on the police attitude toward policy-
making responsibility that there has been no
noticeable effort to measure the effectiveness
of this technique. It is also apparent that
aggressive preventive patrol contributes to the
antagonism of minority groups whose members
are subjected to it. A basic issue, never dealt
with explicitly, is whether, even solely from
a law enforcement point of view, the gain in
enforcement outweighs the cost in commu-
nity alienation .... 13
A conclusion that "the gain is enforcement" does
not outweigh the cost confirmed by studies which
stress the extent of the resentment and alienation
arising from these practices.' 3' More recently the
Crime Commission Police Task Force found that
"in many communities, field interrogations are a
major source of friction between the police and
minority groups," i36 its report refers to this prob-
lem over and over again, and study of the recent
and earlier riots makes clear that such police prac-
tices bear a large share of blame for the disordersS
7
The problems are aggravated when the stops are
accompanied by searches. 13' This community
alienation produces more crime and disrespect for
law, and in turn, more police-community antago-
nism, more fearful and hostile police attitudes, a
greater need for aggressive street patrols, and again,
still more resentment, more alienation and more
crime.
"3 See Remington, The Law Relating to "On the
Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected
Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, in
POLICE POWER AN INnlvrouA.L FREEDOM 11, 15-18
(Sowle ed. 1962).
"'4 DETECTION xix; see also id. at 195.
1"5 Werthman & Piliavin 56.
136 Police Task Force 103.
"' Id. at 147, 157, 178, 184. See also San Diego
Study 82, 128, 142. See also Edwards, 1966 ALl Pro-
ceedings 105-06. How severe the resentment and aliena-
tion can be among Negro youth is vividly described in
the Werthman study, and continually referred to in the
San Diego and Philadelphia studies, though in Phila-
delphia, few problems were found with field interroga-
tion. See note 148 below; also CONOT, RIVERS OF BLOOD,
YEARS OF DARKNESS (1967) passimn.
"'s Police Task Force 185-87,
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It is also clear that such practices reduce citizen
cooperation with police, one of the most important
aids to effective law enforcement. This effect may
be alone sufficient to outweigh any benefits from
field interrogation. Furthermore, it is frequently
noted that a major complaint of ghetto residents
is that they get too little police protection, despite
aggressive patrol tactics. This grievance can be
satisfied only if police-citizen cooperation can be
developed, but such cooperation seems impossible
where stop and frisk practices are common."39
Apart from attitudinal factors, recent field stud-
ies of stop and frisk in high-crime areas in three
cities also raise doubts about the value of such
practices for apprehension of suspects. In 248 in-
terrogations (out of 801 encounters) about 86%
resulted in no admission at all, with no variation
dependent on the seriousness of the charge. Fur-
theremore, "of all [36] admissions in field situations,
more were made voluntarily prior to question-
ing 122] than were made after questioning, [and]
admissions after questioning were less productive
of arrests than... voluntary admissions," (77%
to 57%). And perhaps most significantly, all
felony admissions "were made when there was other
evidence or officer testimony as to occurrence of the
event and the implication of the suspect." In none
of the 116 felony arrests, was there an admission
after questioning-of which there were only 8 any-
way-where the admission was the sole or even
vital evidence on which the arrest was based. Al-
though the sample is not very large, the study
certainly casts doubt on the effectiveness of this
device as a basis for arrest as opposed to crime pre-
vention, and is consistent with those studies which
have raised doubts about the indispensability of
interrogation at the station house.
140
Even members of non-minority groups are often
irritated- and angered by a policeman's stopping
139 For the indispensibility of citizen cooperation to
effective law enforcement, see Edwards, supra n.89 at
60-61; Police Task Force 144. For a demonstration of
the boomerang effect of over-zealous law enforcement
practices, see Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Proseen-
lion Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CORN, L. Q. 436,
454-58 (1964); Police Task Force 144-45; President's
Crime Commission Report 192.
140 Reiss & Black, supra n.15 at 17-20. In a letter to
me dated Oct. 9, 1967, Dr. Reiss wrote that the admis-
sion was generally superflous to probable cause for
arrest.
For doubts about stationhouse interrogation, see
SOBEL, TnE NEW CoN ,FEssION STANDARDS 136-46
(1966).
and interrogating them. Indeed, the authori-
tative manual on field interrogation advises that
"generally the irate, annoyed, sarcastic or un-
cooperative attitude might be expected from a
subject who is in advanced years or who may be
considered an affluent citizen." 141 But minority
groups, parolees,' 4' drug addicts,ln eccentrics,
those who are either different or already some-
what alienated from our society-and in man-
cases more prone to criminality-are both more
susceptible to being stopped and most vulnerable
to adverse consequences. The resentment at the
discrimination is obvious and seriousY
4
Moreover, in many of these cases, physical
abuse will take place if the person-especially a
juvenile-shows resentment at being stopped, or
resistance to questioning. As Professor Charles
Reich has said:
Police are human, and there is a very real
possibility that a person who stands on his
rights one day may find the same officer "out
to get him" another day. Moreover, we have
all too much evidence that talking back to a
police officer can produce violence and per-
haps serious injury to the individual, particu-
larly if he is a Negro or an outcast.Y4 5
And, as indicated earlier, there is some indication
that police do not mind this resistance but even
encourage it.'1
1
BRISTOOw 23: Reich, Police Questioning of Law-
Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE, L. J. 1161 (1966).: The most
cooperative are often the experienced criminals, Note 9
UTAH L. J. 593, 616 (1965) and such cooperation is
itself, according to Bristow, suspicious. Bmisrow 23.
10' Id. at 123; D-TEcTIoN 23, 24, 8.
143id. at 26; Note, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 1194
(1952).
1441Werthman & Piliavin 56; Police Task Force
147. Judge Souris has well described the fear and
police attitudes involved in the stop and frisk of a
17-year-old Negro boy. Souris, supra n.4 at 251-53.
145 Reich, supra n.141 at 1169.
141 See Philadelphia Study 165, 126, and see n.148
infra.
A student in my criminal law seminar decided to find
out for himself exactly how the police would treat a
somewhat independent young person walking the
streets at night. He therefore made the following
experiment:
In order to experience what the citizen is sub-
jected to upon being stopped by the police, two
friends and I dressed in old, but respectable cloth-
ing, proceeded to the lower East side of __, a pre-
dominantly Negro and lower-class white area.
Upon arriving there at 12:30 A.M. on an unusually
cold winter night, we began to walk around. We
had the intention of being subjected to a "stop"
19671
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Even where the result of the stop is conviction
on a gun charge, as in Rivera, is it really so dear
that the community is better off? Possession
crimes are often extremely inchoate crimes. Yet,
in many lower class areas, guns are carried for
status or self-protection,17 and the gun conviction
may itself so prejudice the employment and other
opportunities of an otherwise law abiding citizen
or delinquency-prone juvenile that he may be led
at all times, but we never, in the course of the
evening, broke any law or city ordinance.
We were stopped first after only fifteen min-
utes in the area by a motorcycle policeman. On
this occasion the three of us were walking down
the street looking in the windows of closed stores
in the manner of window shoppers, never re-
maining long in any one place. The officer, a mem-
ber of the [Special Service Unit] drove his motor
cycle upon the sidewalk and blocked our path
and immediately wanted to know what we were
doing in this area. As he asked this question he
alighted from his motorcycle and approached us
with his nightstick in hand. I spoke first saying
it was none of his business why we were there and
I was not going to tell him anything. He responded
with a thrust of the stick into my ribs, saying
"Oh, you're one of those wise asses, huh?" He
then asked my friends the same question. He
grabbed one of my companions, who was bearded,
and began to pummel him saying "You're one
of those peace guys; well, you're not so smart
now". Eventually, we were required to tell him
why we were there and furnish proof of identifica-
tion, on pain of being arrested for assault and
vagrancy. After complying with these requests,
we were ordered to leave the area with the phrase,
"If I see you here again you've had it."
This is merely one out of eight such times
we were stopped. Each time we refused to answer
questions we were sworn at and physically abused.
In the last incident we were standing under a
street light and, observing a prowl car coming
toward us, we walked slowly into the shadows down
a street. On this occasion the officers approached
with drawn revolvers and asked us the same
questions. After giving scmewhat varying ex-
planations we were placed in a prowl car for about
a half an hour where my bearded companion was
given some physical abuse.
On every occasion, we asked why we were
stopped and what we were being charged with.
We were never told anything in this regard, but
that we had just better answer the questions.
Myers, Stop and Frisk 21-22 (unpublished man.
1967).
I have been informed orally that searches also
took place in several of these stops though the paper
inadvertently omitted reference thereto.
141 Poor police protection in the ghetto makes self-
protection particularly important. Conot, supra n.137
at 92, 198-99 ("almost every person keeps a weapon
for self protection".); ADD Center Report, The World
of Youthful Drug Use 29 (Berkeley 1967). See also
Schultz, Why the Negro Carries Weapons, 53 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P. S. 476 (1962). 70% of a 50 man sample in
St. Louis carried weapons for self-protection, and gen-
erally a loaded gun.
deeper into criminal habits, particularly if a jail
sentence results. Similarly, in some cases, the stop
produces frictions and a possible conviction for re-
sistance to arrest which can have the same effect.141
And there may well be alternatives to the
forcible stop. To analyze these, it is important to
break down the power that is sought into its com-
ponents; as the ALI Proposed Model Pre-Arraigu-
ment Code does: (1) the power to request cooper-
ation; and (2) the power to retain that person
forcibly in order to make and follow through on
that request. Theoretically, the combination of
these two is all the investigational power that a
stop and frisk law provides, for as the proposed
ALI Code stressed, there can be no obligation to
answer.' Is the power of forcible detention really
necessary to the purpose of the stop, which is to
obtain information as to identity and an expla-
nation of the suspicious circumstances? Will not
a request for voluntary cooperation generally be as
effective? If not, how can the power to detain tem-
porarily and forcibly help produce information as
to identity and purpose except by the forcible
character of the detention, which raises serious
self-incrimination problems? If the person
stopped is not willing to talk when requested to
do so, is there any reason other than fear why
forcible detention will change things? And if the
person is willing to give an explanation and
identity, will he not often be willing to remain
while the information is being checked?
Experience in Salt Lake City supports the
possibility of such voluntary cooperation. There
it was found that most people will consent to
answer questions, especially the professional
criminal. 10 Indeed, it has been noted often that
14There is reason to think that police may en-
courage such reactions in order to obtain promotions.
McNamara, 189. ("If you want to get out of the 'bag'
[uniform] and into the bureau, shoot somebody") (Em-
phasis in original). See also n.129 supra, and Conot,
supra n.137, at 40-41.
149 See ALI Code § 2.01(2), id. at 5, 101. See also
Combined Council Guidelines 1.C.3 ("The officer
cannot compel an answer and should not attempt to
do so. The suspect's refusal to answer shall not be
considered as an element by the officer in determining
whether or not there is a basis for an arrest.")
1-10 "Where the officer is careful to convey to the
interrogated person that he is merely requesting
information and that the interrogated person is free
to leave at any time, there is of course nothing un-
lawful about the interrogation. In most cases it ap-
parently does not occur to the questioned person to
object because the questioning is done in such a cour-
teous manner that the only reasonable thing is to
answer. The only persons observed to object in such
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despite general agreement that politeness and
citizen cooperation are among the most effective
ways of getting information,1M but that police
put too low a value on this.1' - Salt Lake City
is not a high-crime area and thus its problems
may be different from cities like New York or
Chicago. On the other hand, the difference may
be more in the reported police attitude toward the
persons they stopped, then in the comparative
levels of crime.
It has been argued, however, and with much
force, that such voluntary cooperation cannot be
relied on, for as a practical matter it represents
compliance with the mailed fist behind the re-
quest," ,' and this may well be true. And when such
incidents come to court we are very likely to see
some of the same problems of credibility, and evalu-
ation of the suspect's state of mind to determine
true voluntariness that we find in the consent to
search cases."' Moreover, such requirements may
not be enforceable, given current police attitudes
and the low visibility of the encounter. This
brings us to the fifth benefit of allowing stop and
frisk-reducing police lawlessness and frustration.
For example, the San Diego Police Department
specifically forbids restraint of persons questioned,
and requires that the citizen be given an expla-
nation when stopped, yet field interrogation and
patrol practices are a major cause of minority
circumstances became cooperative when it was ex-
plained that they were not being accused of doing
anything wrong and that the police were not attempting
to impose a curfew. There was no observed instances
where a person refused to cooperate. According to
those officers interviewed, such refusal is rare, and
where it does occur, the officers do not insist unless
there is some indication that the person involved is
engaged in criminal activity." Note, 9 UTAH L. REv.
593, 615 (1965). See also id. at 607-08.
15t Werthman & Pillavin 68, 86; BassTow 20, 26.
52 McNamara 218-19. Girardin, After the Riots;
Force Won't Settle Anything, SAT. EVE. POST (Sept. 23,
1967) pp. 10, 11.
1 See Bator & Vorenberg, supra n.116 at 65:
to permit voluntary cooperation to become a
general justification for the exercise of police
authority would simply be self-deception. If
in fact a policeman stops a suspect by issuing an
order to him or threatening the use of force, the
affixing of the label "voluntary" to the suspect's
compliance only serves to obscure the importance of
making an explicit decision as to what the predicate
for such a stop should be and what procedural
protections should be afforded to the person
stopped.
See also DETECTION 91.
154 See e.g., Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 717
(9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81,
83 (9th Cir. 1962); DETECTIoN, ch. 10.
resentment in that city,155 and explanations are
frequently not given.
Yet, this answer may be a bit too pessimistic.
For one thing, the credibility problem is just as
great where the power to stop and frisk is granted
if meaningful limitations are imposed, even if only
theoretically.3 6 ' MIoreover, for a variety of reasons,
many people will cooperate without force or even
coercion (apart from that inherent in the badges,
uniform, and holstered guns), as the Salt Lake
City and other experiences show; indeed the AL
Code itself provides for such procedures and, as the
Commentary indicates, "officers should rely to the
fullest possible extent on cooperation." "5 "But,"
it immediately continues, "in the absence of a
power... [to forcibly stop], the concept of
voluntary cooperation is put to much strain."
And thereafter follows a series of hard cases:
(1) Without a coercive stop, how can officers
secure the cooperation of someone travel-
ling at 60 miles per hour?
(2) Can the police be prevented from shouting
"stop" at a running man and from en-
forcing that command?
(3) Are the police to be denied the right to
freeze the situation at the scene of a
shooting by ordering that "nobody leave"
to prevent a suspect or witness from
permanently disappearing?
And earlier, the following somewhat overlapping
examples were given:
(4) A person running at 2:00 A.M. with a
heavy package in a business neighborhood;
(5) A person travelling in an automobile who
seems to correspond to the description of a
suspect.
(6) A person walking slowly down a street at
night, looking into parked cars.",'
These six situations fall into three categories:
automobiles (1 and 5); the pure "suspicious cir-
cumstance" case (2, 4, and 6); and emergencies
where there is reasonable ground for belief that a
crime has been committed (3 and 5).
The emergency situation is an easy case for ap-
proving stop and frisk powers, for there a crime
155 Police Task Force 184, 185.
156 See Goldstein, supra n.83 at 165. In a private
conversation, an experienced Legal Aid attorney in
New York City commented that 98% of current
search and seizure cases turned on credibility issues.
157 ALT CODE 96.
1-s Id. at 96, 95.
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has already been committed-or there is good rea-
son to think so-and emergency powers of brief de-
tention are probably unavoidable in order to freeze
the situation.159 Otherwise, the suspect or wit-
nesses may disappear permanently, other lives may
be endangered, memories may fade and evidence
be destroyed. Also, an attempt to flee the officer's
presence in this kind of situation would probably
satisfy probable cause requirements for most
courts. A carefully drawn statute limited to such
situations would probably be acceptable to most
opponents of stop and frisk,160 but this is hardly
the typical stop and frisk situation involving on-
the-street detention, where there is no knowledge
or even probable cause to believe that a crime has
occurred.
The more difficult problem is the pure "suspi-
cious circumstance" case where there is merely
suspicion of criminality, and often of the vaguest
kind. Is it so clear that the right to forcibly stop is
necessary here? Surely the man walking down the
street and looking into cars can be stopped and
interrogated without force. If he refuses to com-
ply-and few in such circumstances will refuse--
the police have not really lost very much. They
have gotten a look at the suspect, and more im-
portantly, by their mere presence they may have
deterred him from perpetrating a crime. Indeed,
the factor of mere police presence is likely to be
among the most important deterrents to crime.
Moreover, if he has not yet committed a crime,
they can do very little even if they force him to
stop except to either arrest him for loitering if he
fails to answer satisfactorily-with all the problems
this raises'6 5-- or to frisk him for weapons, a pa-
tently illegal maneuver unless there is some danger
to the officer.
What, however, of the man who is running at
night with a heavy package in a business neighbor-
hood? (Ex. 2 and 4). Should police be able to
order him to stop? If he refuses, can police force
him, to stop? Suppose he talks but suddenly
breaks off and flees? And if denied the right to
use force in these circumstances, will police obey
such restrictions, regardless of the law?
One answer is that the use of force is so serious
a matter, especially in the highly explosive atmos-
"19 See 9 UTAH L. Rzv. 622; indeed, the particular
example given in the Combined Council Guidelines
involves such an emergency. See also Bell v. United
States, 290 F2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
i60 Foote, supra n.108 at 35-36.
1 See text at nn. 182-95 infra.
phere of a high-crime area, that unless police have
probable cause to believe a man has committed a
crime, they should not be authorized to use it.
They probably should not even be authorized to
issue orders and commands, for an order carries
with it the implicit threat of force. Such a threat
should not be made on mere suspicion, especially
where there is no evidence that a crime has even
been committed.
Moreover, the example may be quite unrealistic.
Few men in suspicious circumstances will refuse to
stop, 62 though they may occasionally refuse to
answer questions. Where the suspect does flee,
that can be considered in determining probable
cause. 163 Flight may be especially significant if the
police actually have knowledge that a crime has
taken place, for then they are likely to have some
idea of the item stolen and-perhaps--of the thief,
so that the flight plus the package, plus other cir-
cumstances, may amount to probable cause.1
6
1
But suppose the police still have no reason to
think a crime has been committed except for the
flight, and so there is no probable cause. 65 Can they
"2This may indeed be because there is a feeling
that the police can force you to stop, but denying
the police stop and frisk power is not really going to
substantially reduce their presently great power and
authority. Moreover, the criminal is generally quite
eager to talk, according to Bristow, and least likely
to run away. See e.g., United States v. Kuntz, 265
F.Supp. 543, 546 (N.D.N.Y. 1967).
i6 DETECTION 32-33 n.19; Broeder, Wong Sun v.
United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB.
L. REv. 483, 493-94 (1963). Most courts give flight
almost conclusive weight on the probable cause issue.
See e.g., United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.
1945); State of Louisiana ex rel. Johnson v. Middle-
brooks, 260 F.Supp. 517 (E.D. La. 1966); United States
v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe, 139 F.Supp. 475 (E.D.Pa.
1956). Cf. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103
(1959). But see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 483-84 (1963); Miller v. United States, 320 F. 2d
767 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Taglavore v. United States, 291
F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Margeson,
259 F. Supp. 256, 265-67 (E.D.Pa. 1966). And see
Conot, supra n. 137 at 295 (flight and "instinctive
reaction in the Negro community" at the sight of a
policeman.)
164 It may be noted that in Henry, Justice Douglas
made much of the fact that the cartons carried by the
suspects had no resemblance to those thought to be
involved in the known crime, a whiskey robbery.
Indeed, in indicating what was absent and might have
produced probable cause, Justice Douglas touched on
many factors that would often be present where a
package is suspected of being contraband: "Its shape
and design might at times be adequate. The weight
of it and the manner in which it is carried might at
times be enough." 361 U.S. at 104.
16"See e.g.. Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir.
1966); United States v. Margeson, 259 F.Supp. 256,
265-67 (E.D. Pa. 1966); People v. Ellsworth, 12 Cal.
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forcibly stop the fugitive? And can they then frisk
him for self-protection? Indeed, this case, which
may be relatively rare, is the one which raises the
true and the hardest stop and frisk problem, for in
most other cases, force and a frisk may be quite
unnecessary.
Strong arguments can be made on both sides.
On the one hand, it would not seem unreasonable
to authorize the police to briefly detain a fleeing
man to seek cooperation or to ask a few questions.
Even without anything else, flight increases the
officer's original suspicion. Also, the officer may
gain some valuable information for future purposes
by simply getting a look at the man, and under
Schmerber v. California,16  there seems to be no
right to deny police such an opportunity, though
Schmerber does not, by itself, approve the use of
force to obtain such an opportunity.
Moreover, if it is clear that the suspect was aware
of the officer's presence and request, flight is a
sufficiently objective fact, credibility questions
aside, that reliance thereon does not pose the diffi-
culties discussed earlier with making objective the
standard of "reasonable suspicion". The case for
allowing a forcible stop in these circumstances
seems even stronger where the flight is in the middle
of a questioning session for although it may still be
for good and innocent reasons, such flight justifies
an even stronger inference of guilt ,vhich is worth
further investigation.
Finally, it is difficult to believe that many
courts can be persuaded to disallow a policeman's
attempt to prevent someone from fleeing before or
during an interrogation.
The arguments on the other side, however,
seem stronger. Do we gain much from allowing the
forcible stop, except for giving the policeman a
good look at the suspect? By hypothesis, there is
still no probable cause to arrest and so the crime
is still not properly cleared. There is never an
obligation to answer, so no information as to
purpose and identity will necessarily result. Indeed,
if the Reiss-Black field interrogation conclusions
are valid, stop and frisk will not produce much
information even where the suspect does not flee,
unless the police already have a good deal of evi-
dence. Furthermore, what of the citizen who does
not immediately flee but refuses to answer any
questions and starts to walk away? Here, there is
not even the need to restrain in order to look at the
App. 2d 844, 2 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1961); People v. Martin,
293 P.2d 52 (1956).
13 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
man, for that has already taken place. By what
right can the police detain him to ask questions
which he has no obligation to answer? Seen under
this aspect, flight is merely one way of refusing to
answer questions, of exercising one's privilege.
Furthermore, when a suspect flees, it is hard to
believe that any response after recapture will be
truly voluntary. Thus, a forcible detention after
flight may turn out to be useless for any informa-
tion that is so obtained may be deemed coerced.
Finally, how much force will be permitted? If
someone is fleeing in a car or on foot, it may indeed
be "frustrating and humiliating to the officer to
grant him an authority to order persons to stop and
then ask him to stand by while his order is
flouted." 117 It may, however, be fatal or seriously
injurious to the suspect to allow the officer to
capture him by the use of force. Although the ALI
Code draftsmen minimize the danger that "moder-
ate force... may escalate into deadly force," '
no reasons for this judgment are given and recent
history points otherwise, especially where the at-
mosphere is tense and the action is sudden. And
even "moderate" .orce may cause serious injury,
either unintended or otherwise.
On balance, it would seem that if the suspect's
flight, together with the other circumstances known
to the police about the crime and its perpetrator,
do not produce probable cause to believe the sus-
pect is the criminal, there should be no right to
forcibly detain him. In such circumstances, the
little knowledge legitimately gained from a forci-
ble detention does not outweigh the indignities
and dangers inherent in such a charged and low-
visibility situation.
The automobile situation (Ex. 2, 5) seems to pre-
sent certain special difficulties. Although there is
probably no inherent analytic difference between
the rights and duties of someone in a car and of
someone on foot, at least so far as criminal investi-
gation is concerned,' 69 it is obviously much harder
to seek voluntary cooperation from a motorist. This
does not, however, imply that force may be used
whenever an officer wishes to see or talk to such a
person, absent probable cause. It does mean that
certain special methods of interception may be re-
quired so that the police may get into a position to
make such a request. Thus, waving down, flashing,
a pull-over request, and even use of a siren, would
167 ALI Code Commentary 100.
168 Ibid.
169 Cf. United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87
(1948).
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seem permissible. Although these all smack of an
order rather than a request, it is hard to see what
can be done about this unless the police are to be
denied all power to request cooperation, a position
not advocated here.
What if the car refuses to stop or slow down? In
the first place, the police may be better off here
than in the pedestrian situation since if the car
tries to get away, it may violate the traffic laws
and thus justify a formal arrest. Also, many states
allow policemen to force a car to stop in order to
check the driver's license and registration, and this
power has been upheld. 70 Motorists know of this
power and most will stop. Finally, refusal to stop
plus other circumstances known to police may be
enough for probable cause, as in the pedestrian
case.
If there is no probable cause, however, and no
traffic violation the police should not be permitted
to forcibly stop the moving car by blocking it off
or other methods. The reasons set forth earlier
with respect to the pedestrian would seem to apply
with even more force here. The police can probably
obtain the license plate number and determine
whether the car is stolen in a manner of minutes.
Also, the use of force in such a circumstance is
even more fraught with danger, since society has
few more dangerous instrumentalities than a mov-
ing car, particularly if out of control. Shooting at
it is obviously perilous to all, but forcing it over or
otherwise blocking it also pose serious dangers.
17'
Another troublesome question relates not so
much to the power to enforce a stop but to the
power to detain for investigation while the suspect's
answers are checked out. A suspect will often re-
spond with some kind of evasive answer, especially
(though not necessarily) if he is in fact guilty of
some wrongdoing. Should not the police be able to
hold him long enough to check out his story?
Should not they be allowed to hold him long enough
to check out this identification?172 And, if he is in a
car, is it not especially important, given the mo-
bility of cars and the high incidence of car theft, to
allow the police to check out his identity?
173
170 United States v. Bhono, 256 F.Supp. 391 (S.D.
N.Y. 1966).
171 When a stationary car arouses police suspicion,
which seems fairly common, there is even less need for
force either to ask questions or to see the occupants.
' United States v. Lewis, 362 F.2d 759 (2d Cir.
1966).
r See Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th
Cir. 1967) (when police checked identity, during
detention, suspect found to have falsely given name
of owner of car which he had stolen.)
The problem is that at this point it becomes
difficult to distinguish such so-called detention
from a "full-blown arrest", for where a person is
forcibly deprived of his liberty for any length of
time beyond the momentary stop involved in
"requesting cooperation," to use the ALI phrase,
the values of individual security and freedom of
movement underlying the Fourth Amendment
are significantly invaded. The proposed ALI
Code seeks to limit this intrusion to 20 minutes,
17 4
and to the place of initial stopping, 75 but apart
from the obvious problem in proving that the
incriminatory oral or tangible material was
obtained within 20 minutes-and in such circum-
stances, the credibility of neither party would be
reliable17 6 -the pressures to expand this would
soon become irresistible. If information starts to
come in after 18 minutes, are the police to let the
man go? Do not all the reasons for the original
stop counsel against such release? Thus, the
court in United States v. Vita'7 found that 8 hours
was not too lengthy, as information and leads
were checked out, and the recent decision in
United States v. Thonws78 stressed the importance
of allowing enough time for investigation. More-
over, the police will be impelled to arrest on less
than probable cause after the 20 minutes is up
in order to hold on to the suspect while infor-
mation is coming in or while waiting for it. Police
arrest now in order to get and check information,
and there is little reason to think this will not
continue to happen, despite the ALI claim that
there will be fewer illegal arrests if the power to stop
is given. And if the information does indicate
criminality, there will be the usual pressure on the
trial court to approve the arrest. The proposal thus
seems highly unworkable.
Even if it were workable, a 20 minute detention
is simply too serious an infringement on one's
liberty.179 This is a period when the suspect is
174 Section 2.02(2).
17 Contra, People v. Hoffman, 24 A.D.2d 497, 261
N.Y.S.2d 651 (2d Dept. 1965).
176 Cf. Kuh, Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35
FoRD. L. Rxv. 233, 236-37 (1966).
1-7 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961) cert. denied, 369 U.S.
823 (1962). In the Reiss-Black study half the suspects
were detained less than 10 minutes, 25% for 20 or more,
10% for 40 or more, and 5% an hour or more, before
the police decided to book or release. Supra n.15 at 12.
18 250 F.Supp. 771, 794-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). For
an example of how such limitations can be ignored, see
Hancock v. Wilson, 363 F.2d 249 (1st Cir. 1966) (eight
hours dentention where statute allowed four hours).
179 See the description of one such stop in Souris,
supra n.4 at 251-52.
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virtually at the mercy of the police, often with no
one else around. Many of the problems of custodial
interrogation will crop up here, even with a
Miranda warning, 80 especially in Niew of the
current attitudes and methods of field interro-
gation discussed earlier. One can, of course, urge
police to act politely at all times, but where there is
power, especially over members of the lower
classes, young people, narcotic addicts and mi-
nority groups, it will not be exercised mildly and
politely, at least not for a long time to come.
And, as Professor Herman Goldstein has noted,
the problem is "often complicated by the isolated
conditions under which the two parties come in
contact with each other.... The absence of
witnesses to such contact makes it difficult to
reconstruct the relationship, should some aspect
of it subsequently be subject to question", a prob-
lem which underlay Miranak.' 8
Exposure to a 20-minute stop and frisk is not a
trivial experience, and only judicial and partisan
Erewhonism can think of it in that way.
Reference to custodial interrogation also
raises serious self-incrimination problems with
respect to the power to forcibly detain. Such
problems are particularly acute in New York
which, as of September, 1967, adopted the following
loitering statute:
A person is guilty of loitering when he:
6. Loiters, remains or wanders in or about
a place without apparent reason and under
circumstances which justify suspicion that he
may be engaged or about to engage in crime,
and, upon inquiry by a peace officer, refuses to
identify himself or fails to give a reasonably
credible account of his conduct and purposes.
82
By definition, the stop authorized by the statu-
tory provision takes place in "circumstances which
justify suspicion" and it allows an officer to
demand the suspect's identity and an explanation,
180 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445, 448 (1966).
181 See Goldstein, supra n.83 at 165. Another alleged
purpose of stop and frisk is to detain a suspect long
enough for a complainant to try to identify him. This
purpose does not seem legitimate under the New York
law at least, which refers solely to interrogation as to
identity and purpose. See Galvin & Radelet, supra n.1
at 327-28.
182 N.Y. REv. PEz. L. § 240.35.6 (1967). This is
patterned after § 250.6 of the Model Penal Code but
lacks most of the latter's attempted protective features.
It should be noted that under the New York statute,
a refusal to provide diter identity or explanation is
enough for conviction.
which probably has to be "a reasonably credible
account of his conduct and purposes, within the
loitering statute.1 3 This means that the sanction
for refusing to talk is a loitering charge, and/or
exposure to further interrogation in the jail
house.18 The constitutionality of the loitering
statute is highly dubious,'8" but until struck down
it puts the defendant in a dilemma: if he refuses
to talk, he may be charged with loitering, but if
he does respond, he may incriminate himself,
for the questions authorized by a stop and frisk
law necessarily call for potentially incriminating
answers. Indeed, questions solely as to identity
can be incriminatory, 18  and the questions au-
thorized by the stop and frisk law and the ALI
Model Pre-Arraignment Code, for example, go
into possible past and future criminality.
In view of this, what of the Miranda warning?
Is the stop always so "significant" a deprivation
of liberty that the four-fold warning must be
given?187 The proposed ALl Code provides that a
1- In Peters, the frisk and continued detention were
justified on the ground that the account of conduct
and purposes was rot reasonably credible. 18 X.Y.2d
at 242.
184 See, e.g., Note, 9 UTAH L. REv. at 621. This may
be the sanction in most jurisdictions, even where there
is no loitering statute, for some police believe silence
justifies arrest. DETEcTION 57; Werthman & Piliavin
87.
I" See Amsterdam, supra n.127 at 228; cf. Mans-
field, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination and the Government's Need
for Information, 1966 Sup. Cr. REv. 103; City of
Cleveland v. Forrest, 223 .,N,.E.2d 661 (Cleve. Ohio
Mun. Ct. 1967) (penalizing failure to give a "responsible
and satisfactory explanation infringes on Fifth Amend-
ment and arrest for violation of such a statute violates
Fourth Amendment.) See also United States v. Marge-
son, 259 F.Supp. 256, 267-69 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (New
Jersey statute requiring a "good account" unconstitu-
tionally vague); District of Columbia v. Hicks, Cr. N.
D.C. 34194-66 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. May 4, 1967) (stat-
ute punishing "not giving a good account of himself" by
one wandering the streets late at night); but see People
v. Weger, No. 13090 (Ct. of App., 2d Dist. Cal. June
5, 1967) (upheld statute punishing a loiterer "who
refuses to identify himself and to account for his
presence... if the surrounding circumstances ... in-
dicate to a- reasonable man that the public safety
demands such identification").
186 See Mansfield, supra n.185 at 122.
Is- See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
Comparison of the final version of the Miranda opinion
with that released on the day of decision discloses
what could be an important change in this context.
In the initial version, which appears in the slip opinion,
U.S. Law Week and the Supreme Court Reporter
advance sheets the court defined "custodial inter-
rogation" in one place as involving a "depriv[ation]
of... liberty in any significant way." Sup. Ct. Adv.
Sheet, Vol. 86, No. 17, pp. 1602, 1612; Slip Opinion,
p. 6; 34 U.S. L. Week 4521, 4523 (6-14-66). At other
1967]
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warning as to the lack of obligation to answer be
given only when there is "sustained questioning"
of someone who "may have committed a crime." 195
This means that no warning need be given to
some one who is suspected of being "about to
commit a felony or misdemeanor," a possible
subject of an ALI Code-approved stop, and the tar-
get of most forcible stops, insofar as this practice is
designed for crime prevention. Though there are
difficult theoretical problems involved in the
applicability of the privilege to future criminality 89
there can still be a great many instances where
the person involved in such questioning may be
subject to prosecution for attempt or some
other inchoate crime. 9 Moreover, if the police
practice is indeed to rely heavily on a prior record
in charging with crime, a parolee or ex-convict is
particularly liable to incriminate himself for
possibly unsolved neighborhood crimes simply
by identifying himself. Surely, the warning is at
least as important to this person.
Moreover, the officer will rarely know that he
is about to "engage in sustained questioning"
when he starts the interrogation, the point at
which the warning is most important. In most
cases the length of questioning will depend on
the answers he gets. The officer usually knows very
little about what is happening, and there is a
good chance of ready exculpation, or at least that
is one of the reasons given in the proposed ALI
Code for allowing this power. Requiring a prelimi-
nary judgment as to whether "sustained question-
ing" will be engaged in is thus highly unrealistic.
points where custodial interrogation is referred to,"significant" is omitted. See Slip Opinion at 7, 29,
40; Sup. Ct. Adv. Sheet, Vol. 86, No. 17 at 1612, 1624,
1630; 34 U.S. L. W. at 4523, 4530, 4533. In the final
version however, as appearing in 384 U.S., the word
"significant" has been inserted in all of these. See
id. at 445, 467, 478, 86 Sup. Ct. 1612, 1624, 1630. The
insertion of the word "significant" throughout may
affect the decision of whether Miranda should not be
applied to the stop and frisk. Certainly those who
claim that it is a mild and innocuous detention, see
discussion of the Rivera opinion supra, would deem
it not "significant." See Schwartz, Retroactivity, Rdia-
bilitv and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin,
33 U. Cm. L. Rtv. 719, 758 n.203 (1966).
1" Aml Code § 201(2). The directly pertinent section is
2.02(3) which requires the warning to be given to
persons forcibly detained under § 2.02(2), but only"subject to the limitations of § 2.01." This would
apparently now require the Miranda warning, which
was laid down after this section of the ALI Code was
proposed.
199 See Mansfield, supra n.185 at 151-58.
190 Section 5.01 of the Model Penal Code extends
attempt quite far back in order to apply penal sanc-
tions to dangerous persons.
On the other hand, one careful observer has
concluded that field interrogation would become
ineffective if a warning had to be given. 91 If so,
and there are reasons to doubt this in view of
experiences in some areas, 192 we may be at a consti-
tutional impasse: if a warning is required, the tech-
nique is ineffective if constitutional, and unconsti-
tutional if kept effective.
So far, one lower New York court has held that
the Miranda warning must be given in the stop and
frisk situation, and it is hard to see how the
answer could be otherwise, especially where the
suspect resists detention, though the Counsel to
the New York State Police has advised that the
warning need not be given.193 If this holding is
sustained by the Court of Appeals, a loitering
conviction based on an inadequate or false expla-
nation or identity, or a refusal to answer would be
doubly unconstitutional for the warning would be
false and deceptive. The officer cannot truthfully
say "you need not answer," for if the suspect
relies on this advice, his silence will have con-
tributed to a loitering charge.'91
The Frisk
Denial of a general power to forcibly stop on
suspicion does not entirely settle the question of
when a policeman may frisk, for if the police are
granted the power to request cooperation, to
wave down cars, and to freeze emergencies, there
will often be the same threat to the policeman's
safety as if the stop were fully permitted.
Where a policeman's life is in danger, it is hard
to oppose measures designed to provide some added
safety. 9 5 But especially here, the dangers of abuse
are so high, as the New York cases show, that the
claim must be subjected to greater scrutiny.196
The first thing to be noted is the somewhat un-
expected fact that most police deaths apparently
"9 DETECTION 67.
'92 Reiss & Black, supra n.15 at 28 n.6; 9 UTAH L.
Rv. at 615; cf. the experience with Miranda reported
in Harris, Miranda v. Arizona: Is it Being Applied?
CRIm L. BULL. 135, 139 (1967).
193 People v. Reason, 52 Misc.2d 425, 430 (1966).
Compare with McKane, Comments on Miranda v.
Arizona, in THE LAW ENFORCEMENTEO C r XcUIVE 7-8
(N.Y. 1966) (Advice by Counsel, N.Y. State Police);
see also United States v. Kuntz, 265 F.Supp. at 547.
194 Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959); U.S. ex rel.
Caserino v. Denno, 259 F.Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
195 See Ronayne, The Right to Investigate and New
York's "Stop and Frisk"Law. 33 FORD. L. R1v. 211,
237 (196); Note, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182, 1204 (1952).
19 6 The problem of an unnecessarily intrusive search




result from accidents, and particularly from trying
to handle family squabbles although only the police
are subjected systematically to violent assaults.
1 97
But even with such violent assaults, it appears
that police work may be less dangerous than many
other outdoors occupations. The Police Task Force
quoted a study showing that the average rate of
total police fatalities while on duty for the period
1950-60 (including accidents) was 33 fatalities
per 100,000 officers, which was less than the 1955
rate of deaths on duty from mining (94), agri-
culture (55), construction (76), and transpor-
tation (44) j98 These figures may be somewhat
out-of-date in view of the crime rate increase and a
possible general increase in lawlessness. But even
if the figure is substantially higher, it is still
not too much higher than other outdoor occupa-
tions and it led the author of this study "to suggest
that the general belief that law-enforcment
activity is one of extreme peril is not confirmed by
an analysis of the facts." I
Moreover, one of the few other studies of police
shootings also shows some rather remarkable
results: out of 110 cases, 43% involved vehicles,
often during and after the stop, and 51% in-
volved shootings in buildings.1 0 No significant
number were on the street, and in many of the
vehicle cases, the shooting appeared totally
unpredictable. If the frisk were to have an effect
in these latter situations, everyone would have to
be searched.
On the other hand, this may not take into ac-
count the numerous assaults to which police are
subjected. We have relatively little information
here and the little we do have is inconclusive. The
Lohman-Misner study of the Philadelphia police
disclosed the following incidents in 1965:
Aggravated Assault and Battery on
Police Officer
By gun ........................ 9
By knife or cutting instrument... 9
By other dangerous weapon ...... 23
By hands, fists, etc ............. 129
Sub-Total ........................... 170
197Robin, Justsifiable Homicide by Police Officers,
54 J. CnRi. L., C. & P. S. 225, 230 n.16 (1954); Presi-
dent's Commission Report 92; SKOLNICK 47.
191Police Task Force 189; quoting Robin, supra
n.197 at 228-29.
199 Id. at 231 See also, Conot, supra n.137, at 122.
200 Bristow, Police Offi-cer Shootings, 54 3. CRIu.
L., C. &.P. S. 93 (1963). Of the 51%, 71% involved
cases where the police knew or should have known
the suspect was armed.
Assault and Batter, on Police
Officer
Simple assault and battery ....... 1,160
Resisting arrest ................. 1,300
Interfering with an officer ........ 111
Sub-Total ........................... 2,571
TOTAL ............................... 2,74120
These figures show only 41 assaults with a danger-
ous weapon, the kind of assault which the stop
and frisk power is supposed to prevent, in a city
of 2 million, with 5725 policemen, 202 and hundreds
of thousands of difficult citizen-police encounters.
However, it is possible and indeed likely that the
Philadelphia police did stop and frisk, and per-
haps had they not done so, the serious assaults
would have been higher. Yet, these searches were
apparently made so innocuously that field inter-
rogation practices were not found to be a major
source of tension in Philadelphia although this
finding does not seem entirely supported by the
study. 03 On balance, however, it is difficult to
draw very firm conclusions from these statistics
and very few other reliable figures seem to be
available.
This, of course, is not to say that measures to
reduce injuries and fatalities should not be taken.
One of the most important of these, however, is to
reduce police-citizen frictions and the very power
sought-the power to stop forcibly-has been
found to increase such frictions. Moreover, the
power to frisk, separate and apart from the power
to stop, aggravates such frictions and dangers. In a
sense, then, it may be that the power to stop and
frisk, especially as applied, actually increases
rather than reduces danger.20 4
Moreover, it is hard to ignore the fact that here,
at least, any power at all will be abused. The
courts have made it quite clear that in the name of
police safety, they will always allow a frisk of
extensive proportions, and it is difficult to see how
this can be avoided. A corollary hard reality is that
police will use this power not really to protect
themselves but to seize and confiscate weapons
and other contraband. Insofar as the former is
-01 Philadelphia Study 55.
21 Id. at 29.
203 Compare id. at 173 with id. at 121-27, 154 showing
much resentment.
204 Compare the analogous situation in England,
where police have been denied guns, in order to in-
crease their safety. The situation in England may,
however, be changing.
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concerned, it is arguable that this too serves a
crime prevention purpose. Some aspects of this
have already been discussed, but one additional
point may be made: there is very little evidence
that confiscation of weapons really does reduce
crime. As the American Bar Foundation study
commented, it is doubtful that such weapons
are irreplaceable, particularly knives, and it is
therefore impossible to know the effect of con-
fiscation.2 05
But how may we deny a policeman the right to
frisk for self-protection? Moreover, if such a frisk
is made, and it discloses contraband -either a
gun or something else--should that fact be ig-
nored? Perhaps the suggestion of several com-
mentators that the fruits may not be usable in
evidence might be of some help,206 but as is often
pointed out, the purpose of much of the frisking
really has little to do with prosecution, and much
to do with harassment and pure confiscation. And
surely one cannot return property illegally
possessed to the person illegally possessing it.
Nevertheless, the potentiality for abuse and
indiscriminate use is so great that the frisk should
generally not be allowed and other alternatives
should be sought.2 7 Some of these alternatives
were set out in the American Bar Foundation
study: one is to request the suspect to keep his
hands in sight or in a certain position. Another,
which already seems common, is for police to
travel in pairs or more. Bristow lists several other
precautions relating, inter alia, to the officer's
position vis-a-vis the suspect, none of which involve
a frisk.218 Still another is to request the suspect
to leave his car. Whether these are as effective
as a frisk is hard to tell for we have very little
knowledge of how useful the frisk is and how
effective these alternatives might be. They do
seem less intrusive and, given the real circum-
stances of most frisks, would probably not reduce
the officer's safety.
There still remains the man known to be
dangerous. Where the evidence is strong that there
is such danger, a frisk should probably be per-
mitted, but it is difficult to imagine too many such
20 5 DEECTON 195, 204.
200 See the suggestion of Judge Van Voorhis, in
People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 604, 606-08; Schoenfeld,
The "Stop and Frisk" Law is Unconstitutional, 16
SYRACUSE L. REv. 627, 640 (1966); Note, 39 N.Y.U.L.
Rxv. 1093, 1098 (1964).
207 See Fuld, J., dissenting in Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d
at 448, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 464, 468.20
8 BRISTow 25-26.
circumstances where the officers would not also
have probable cause. Even in such circumstances,
alternatives might be preferable if there were no
probable cause, such as approaching with a
drawn gun, while making it clear that the detention
is to be extremely brief and only to ask a few
questions.
The use of such alternatives will, of course, not
totally eliminate the search for harassment and
confiscation purposes, but it will deprive it of the
color of legality and this is at least one step toward
eliminating such practices. Whether such elimi-
nation can succeed is a different question, but at
least the law will not have allowed itself to be
used as an excuse and a pretext for such conduct.
2 0
CONCLUSION
It seems clear that much is lost by legitimating
the stop and frisk in the normal street situation, and
perhaps unnecessarily. Therefore, stop and frisk
should thus rarely be allowed.
Yet, some doubts remain. For one thing, there
remains a serious problem of police compliance
with such a decision, which most will find new,
chafing, and unreasonable. Police honestly believe
that their primary job is crime prevention, that
aggressive stop and frisk is useful to this, and that
the community and their superiors do in fact
expect it of them. a0 And few can deny all of these
with complete assurance. The first and third
seem quite true and the impact of aggressive
police patrol on crime prevention may be sub-
stantial. We simply do not know. Moreover, the
explosive nature of the usual police-person en-
counter in high-crime or other minority areas, the
policeman's need to assert his authority, and his
belief that the frisk is necessary to his safety
support his desire to frisk, and these too are real
considerations. As Skolnick and others have con-
209 It is for somewhat related reasons that a position
taken by the Ohio Court of Appeals in State v. Terry,
5 Ohio App.2d, 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966), cert.
granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 2050 (1967), is troubling.
That court refused to apply the exclusionary rule, in
part on the ground that police would continue to
frisk anyway. 214 N.E.2d at 121. But this ignores one
of the other aspects of the exclusionary rule which
is to ensure that the state, and particularly the court,
does not rely on violations of law in order to enforce
the law. See Schwartz, supra n.187 at 250-52. Thus,
regardless of deterrent efficacy, evidence obtained by
an illegal frisk should be excluded.
210 Indeed, there are indications that some superiors
except certain field interrogation quotas to be met.




cluded, a policeman will not obey the law very
strictly if it does not comport with what he con-
siders reasonable law enforcement objectives,
especially since much of what he does in this area
is of low visibility. In such circumstances, and
others, will any citizen cooperation that is obtained
really be "voluntary"?
Furthermore, can courts really do much to
discourage or control the stop and frisk, even if
this practice is found to be unconstitutional? As
noted, the judiciary can only control what goes
on in the courts, and little of this conduct is aimed
toward that forum. Moreover, unless police are con-
vinced that both their superiors and the community
are against such practices, the low visibility of such
incidents ensures that little judicial or other con-
trol can be exercisedY' Instead, we may have more
police resentment and hostility, which may only
aggravate matters.
Nevertheless, the burden on those who would
create new constitutional doctrine to justify a
deep infringement of personal security is a heavy
one. A very strong case must be made that the
infringement is necessary and that it can be con-
trolled. Such conditions are particularly important
when we consider abandoning probable cause,
which reflects a fundamental judgment about when
a man may be deprived of his liberty, one of the
most serious invasions of a free man's rights.
Neither of these two conditions are met with the
case for stop and frisk. Despite its possible and
perhaps substantial benefits, we simply do not know
that the power to stop does more over-all good than
harm, and that alternatives are inadequate. And
we do know that, for many reasons, almost no
extra-judicial control is likely or even feasible:
meaningful police self-regulation is a vain hope,
nor can the legislatures be counted on to impose
controls, for there is no great community support
for restricting such powers.
The camel's nose argument is particularly ap-
propriate in this context for once we abandon an
insistence on probable cause, an insistence that a
person not be deprived of his liberty to the extent
produced by a forcible stop and search except upon
evidence which would lead a prudent man to believe
21 The student involved in the incidents described
at n.146 supra, reported that he was stopped 8 times
in one evening, but no reports were made. The Police
Task Force estimated that San Diego police made
over 400,000 stops in one year, but reported only
200,000. Police Task Force 184. See also Goldstein,
supra n.83 at 165.
that the suspect has committed a crime, we truly
open the door to other possible exceptions. For ex-
ample, the New York Combined Council of Law
Enforcement Officials, which sponsored and pushed
through -New York's stop and frisk law, has had
introduced into the New York State Legislature a
"stop and frisk on wheels" bill, to allow the search
of a car and all of its occupants on reasonable
suspicion that narcotics can be found in the car.
212
The proposal seems patently unconstitutional
under Carroll v. United States213 and United States v.
DiRe,24 but the bill still passed one house of the
legislature,215 and a similar argument from prec-
edent was unpersuasive in New York when the
stop and frisk bill and Rivera became law. The
same contention is being made for this proposal
as for stop and frisk powers over pedestrians: it is
necessary for dealing with the crime problem in the
modern urban community, with additional
arguments about the problems posed for narcotic
law enforcement by the automobile.
21 6
Furthermore, one of the greatest problems facing
law enforcement today is the lack of citizen cooper-
ation. Such cooperation is especially necessary
in our explosive slums and high-crime areas, but
the widespread use of stop and frisk contributes
substantially to preventing such cooperation. A
substantial reduction in the stop and frisk practices
might join with other factors to increase citizen
cooperation, thereby much improving law enforce-
ment.
There is also a further consideration. Regardless
of whether the courts can substantially reduce stop
and frisk abuses, the court's role goes beyond con-
trolling police conduct: it also has an obligation to
maintain the constitutional and legal purity of the
judicial process, so that regardless of deterrent
impact, the processes of justice must not be tainted
by official misconduct. The hypocrisy of using in-
justice to enforce justice is a luxury that our so-
ciety cannot continue to afford.
The courts may also have a greater impact on the
extent of these practices than is generally assumed.
For one thing, if the Court legitimates stop and
frisk, it will inevitably encourage it.217 There is no
212 . 831, A. Int. 3163, 1967 Sess., N.Y. State Legis"
223 267 U.S. 132 (1928).
214 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
21
1 The bill died in the other house, but this may
have been in part because the session was a very short
one.
218 See Legislative Memo accompanying bill cited
at n.212.
217 Some Philadelphia police have opposed legitima-
tion of the frisk on the ground that the police will
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middle ground between condemnation and endorse-
ment, for the theoretically possible middle-limited
and controlled stop and frisk-is a practical im-
possibility. Moreover, approval of New York's
virtually total abdication of judicial control over
this practice will encourage other states to emulate
New York's example,21 8 for today, support for so-
abuse the law and engage in far more frisks than they
do even now. Note, 100 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1182, 1204,
1213 (1952).218 In People v. Gallmon, 19 N.Y.2d 389, 227 N.E.2d
284 (1967), the New York Court of Appeals eroded
Mapp even further by creating a power to enter prem-
ises for non-arrest "investigatory" purposes without the
need to comply with the announcement requirements,
and impliedly, without probable cause. As in the analo-
gous on-the-street "frisk", the fruits of such conduct
were held fully utilizable in a criminal proceeding. Here
again, the court's factual premises and legal theory had
not been urged by either party, for it was agreed by all
that the officer entered to make an arrest, the main
issues on appeal being whether a passkey entry was
"breaking", and whether the exclusionary rule was an
called crime prevention pressures are very strong
indeed.
The Supreme Court has been our great teacher
of governmental morality. If it makes clear exactly
what stop and frisk involves, how little is really
gained and how much is definitely lost, a process
may be set in motion which will educate the com-
munity as to what a decent society should want and
pay for. If the Court does not prohibit these prac-
tices, it will be a sign to the bitterly alienated
minorities and slum residents, the main victims of
stop and frisk, that still another of our society's
institutions of orderly change cannot be relied
upon when the crisis is at its worst. The fact that
this particular institution has led in the use of
peaceful means to eliminate injustice will only
make the lesson more effective.
appropriate remedy for a violation of the announce-
ment requirement. Compare text at n. 123, supra.
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